

*This file contains the Table of Contents, Introduction and Chapters 1 and 2 of*  
**Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries**  
*17th Edition (2018/19) by James Kessler QC*

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# To My Jane

*Censor, senior partner*

*Lover, friend*

*Lodestar*



## INTRODUCTION AND WHAT'S NEW

### *Scope of this book*

There are three themes to this book:

- (1) Taxation of foreign domiciliaries
- (2) Taxation of non-residents on UK assets
- (3) Taxation of UK residents on foreign assets

To attempt to cover these topics comprehensively is ambitious, perhaps quixotic. This book is in danger of bursting, particularly because these territorial issues can only sensibly be discussed in a wider context. But one cannot address the first topic without the second and third: in taxation, as in life, everything is connected. Thus what started as a book on foreign domiciliaries has become a book which seeks to address all the territorial limits to UK taxation.

### *The year 2017/18 in review*

OTS stated in 2017:

The UK tax code is widely cited as being the longest in the world”.<sup>1</sup>

This claim had been made at least since 2010.<sup>2</sup> In recent years Parliament added.<sup>3</sup>

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- 1 It is hard to empirically assess the claim that the UK has the longest tax code in the world, and OTS makes no attempt to do so. But if any readers are aware of other serious contenders for that title, I would be interested to hear.
  - 2 For the older references see the Introduction to the 15<sup>th</sup> (2016/17) of this work.
  - 3 Finance Act page counts are a rough proxy for the ever growing complexity of the UK tax system, but not an altogether bad one. A (slightly) better proxy would also consider secondary legislation and HMRC guidance; and, perhaps, case law; then the page counts would multiply the Finance Act numbers set out here tenfold. For a discussion of the multidimensional concept of tax complexity, see Tran-Nam and Evans, “Towards the Development of a Tax System Complexity Index” (2014) *Fiscal Studies* Vol 35 p.341. OTS have published two (somewhat simplistic) discussions of tax complexity:

**Finance Act(s) Pages**

2012	703 (a record)
2013	648
2014	663
2015	562 (two acts because of election)
2016	649
2017	813 (a new record) <sup>4</sup>
2018	187

In the same period, OTS has not achieved perceptible improvement, at least in relation to the topics covered in this book.<sup>5</sup>

It is easier to *talk* of simplification:

Our system remains too complicated ... We will therefore simplify the tax system.<sup>6</sup>

The reader may think that the satirists better identify the reality:

We will further complicate the UK tax system so that large companies can no longer find loopholes.<sup>7</sup>

Scotland continues its fiscal drift from the UK, with Northern Ireland and Wales now following.

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*Length of Tax Legislation as a Measure of Complexity* (Apr 2012)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/193496/ots\\_length\\_legislation\\_paper.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193496/ots_length_legislation_paper.pdf)

OTS Complexity Index (2012)

[http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/193493/ots\\_complexity\\_index\\_methodology\\_paper.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193493/ots_complexity_index_methodology_paper.pdf)

4 This is the combined length of the two FAs 2017.

5 See eg IFS, “OTS: Looking Back and Looking Forward” TLRC Discussion Paper No. 11 (2014) tactfully referring to “insufficient buy-in to the simplification process by HMRC, HM Treasury and government”. But this view is not held by OTS: see Sherwood, Evans and Tran-Nam “The Office of Tax Simplification - The Way Forward?” [2017] BTR 249.

[http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/TLRC/TLRC\\_OTSDP\\_11.pdf](http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/TLRC/TLRC_OTSDP_11.pdf)

In (I think) 2013 the government came up with the slogan “Creating a simpler, fairer tax system” under which OTS now operates; which imagines away a troubling reality in which simplicity and fairness are competing values which require hard choices.

<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/creating-a-simpler-fairer-tax-system>

6 Conservative party manifesto 2017 p.14

<https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/manifesto2017/Manifesto2017.pdf>

7 Official Monster Raving Loony Party Manifesto 2017

<https://www.loonyparty.com/2017-general-election-manifesto>



The FA 2018 has introduced the second stage of the protected-trust regime, which is a revolution in the taxation of offshore trusts. It also provides legislative authority for implementing the BEPS multilateral convention.

The courts have decided many interesting cases, including *Barclays Wealth v HMRC*; *Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors*; *R (oao) Hely-Hutchinson v HMRC*.

OECD has published the 2017 update to the Model Tax Convention, noting, I think correctly:

International tax issues have never been as high on the political agenda as they are today.

The growth in complexity is matched by a decline in HMRC efficiency. A contribution to the Trusts Discussion Forum provides:

I'm now at the point where I diarise my chasing letters and complaints ahead of time, and have template letters for this purpose. Initial letter, a chasing letter a month later, a second chasing letter a month after that, and a formal complaint a month after that. It is not unusual for me to have half a dozen open complaints against HMRC at any given time, but whatever it is I was complaining about is generally sorted within 30 days of the complaint letter. In one case I was even able to get them to pay our costs for chasing them.

Even three years ago I could not have imagined having to take this approach to HMRC, and I can only speculate as to how demoralising it is for the remaining staff.<sup>8</sup>

### *The future*

The government intends to introduce:

- (1) CGT on non-residents gains from disposals of UK property.<sup>9</sup> This is to take effect in 2019/20.
- (2) Corporation tax on non-UK resident companies' UK property income

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<sup>8</sup> 6 October 2017 under thread "HMRC delays".

See <http://trustsdiscussionforum.co.uk>

<sup>9</sup> HMRC, "Taxing gains made by non-residents on UK immovable property: Consultation document" (Nov 2017)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/661467/Taxing\\_gains\\_made\\_by\\_non-residents\\_on\\_UK\\_immovable\\_property\\_-\\_consultation.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661467/Taxing_gains_made_by_non-residents_on_UK_immovable_property_-_consultation.pdf)

and gains.<sup>10</sup> This is to take effect in 2020/21.

Both changes will add to complexity. CT is a more sophisticated tax than IT, in many respects, in particular the taxation of interest (loan relationships) and hybrids. Private client practitioners advising foreign companies will have to master CT rules which hitherto they could leave for corporate tax practitioners.

The government has yet to map out a strategy and tactics for unravelling the UK's connections with the EU. In the 2017/18 edition of this work I said: "This is a daunting task, and will take a generation if not more." One year on, we are no further ahead.

We face an extended period of change and uncertainty, in politics, economics, law and taxation.

We will continue to live in fiscally exciting times.

*Thanks ...and request for help*

I am very grateful to my colleagues in chambers, especially Robert Venables QC and Philip Simpson QC, for discussions on many aspects of tax. I owe a great debt to Jane Hunt and Ruth Shaw who work patiently on this challenging text throughout the year.

Comments from readers and professional clients continue to be of the greatest value and interest to the author.

The pleasure in writing this book consists in the interest of the questions which it raises, and the success which it may have achieved in answering them. It seeks to state the law as at 6 April 2018.

James Kessler QC

Old Square Tax Chambers  
15 Old Square  
Lincoln's Inn WC2A 3UE

*kessler@kessler.co.uk*  
*http://www.kessler.co.uk*

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10 See HMRC "Non-resident companies chargeable to Income Tax and non-resident CGT: Consultation Document" (Mar 2017)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/601032/Non-resident\\_companies\\_chargeable\\_to\\_Income\\_Tax\\_and\\_non-resident\\_CGT\\_-\\_consultation.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/601032/Non-resident_companies_chargeable_to_Income_Tax_and_non-resident_CGT_-_consultation.pdf)

HMRC "Non-resident companies chargeable to income tax and non-resident CGT: summary of responses" (Dec 2017)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/664178/Non-resident\\_companies\\_chargeable\\_to\\_income\\_tax\\_and\\_non-resident\\_CGT\\_summary\\_of\\_responses.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/664178/Non-resident_companies_chargeable_to_income_tax_and_non-resident_CGT_summary_of_responses.pdf)

## OBTAINING FURTHER ADVICE - AND DISCLAIMER

### *Further advice*

If you want advice on which you are legally entitled to rely you can obtain it - but not from this work.

In particular, you may instruct the author to advise. I enjoy writing, but spend most of my time giving independent specialist professional advice in private client matters, especially areas covered in this work. For further details see <http://www.kessler.co.uk>.

### *TFD Online*

TFD Online is an online version of this book and more. It can be used:

- (1) to search the text of this book or to access it online.
- (2) to see if the book has been updated
- (3) to correct or contribute to the book

TFD Online is moderated by Mary Ashley, a member of Tax Chambers, 15 Old Square, Lincoln's Inn.

TFD Online is accessible on <http://www.foreigndomiciliaries.co.uk>. An authorisation code for a 3 week trial period is in the inside cover of this volume.

### *Disclaimer*

CIOT issue *professional guidance* with a disclaimer:

While every care has been taken in the preparation of this guidance the PCRT Bodies do not undertake a duty of care or otherwise (?) for any loss or damage occasioned by reliance on this guidance. Practical guidance cannot and should not be taken to substitute appropriate legal advice.<sup>1</sup>

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1 CIOT, *Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation* (2016), para 1.12  
<https://www.tax.org.uk/professional-standards/professional-rules/professional-conduct-relation-taxation>

The second sentence is an improvement on the common but rather bizarre form that guidance on legal issues “does not constitute legal advice”.

When that appeared in 2011 it seemed extraordinary. But it rapidly became ubiquitous; nowadays no professional body issues guidance without a disclaimer.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, and *a fortiori*, the views expressed in this book are put forward for consideration only and are not to be relied upon. Neither the author nor the publisher accept responsibility for any loss to any person arising as a result of any action or omission in reliance of this work. But could anyone have thought that a claim might arise in absence of this disclaimer?

*A note to the lay reader*

This book is not intended as a self-help guide, and is addressed to tax practitioners. In earlier editions I said: "... but it is readable for a lay person." I think that is still true, though the text is more daunting than when I first wrote those words, because the law it describes has become much more complicated. However, initiation in these matters must often be by the taxpayer. If you wish to research this subject in depth, and so take more control of your own tax affairs, read on. But for implementation you will need to find professionals to advise you. Self-help guides extol "the benefit of bypassing expensive lawyers"; but the bypass may prove the more expensive route in the long run.

*Edition history*

1 <sup>st</sup> 2001	5 <sup>th</sup> 2006	9 <sup>th</sup> 2010	13 <sup>th</sup> 2014
2 <sup>nd</sup> 2003	6 <sup>th</sup> 2007	10 <sup>th</sup> 2011	14 <sup>th</sup> 2015
3 <sup>rd</sup> 2004	7 <sup>th</sup> 2008	11 <sup>th</sup> 2012	15 <sup>th</sup> 2016
4 <sup>th</sup> 2005	8 <sup>th</sup> 2009	12 <sup>th</sup> 2013	16 <sup>th</sup> 2017

This book was called *Taxation of Foreign Domiciliaries* for 9 editions; it changed to *Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries* in the 10<sup>th</sup> edition.

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2 For instance, the Law Society likewise issue a disclaimer for their Practice Notes: The standard form is: "While care has been taken to ensure that they are accurate, up to date and useful, the Law Society will not accept any legal liability in relation to them."

## CHAPTER ONE

# FOREIGN DOMICILE: TAX POLICY

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Tax competition
  - 1.2.1 Tax competition: analysis
  - 1.2.2 Other tax competition
  - 1.2.3 Tax competition within UK
  - 1.2.4 Attitudes to tax competition
  - 1.2.5 Tax competition: EU-law
  - 1.2.6 International tax law reform
  - 1.2.7 “Customers” of HMRC
- 1.3 Fairness
  - 1.3.1 What is fairness
  - 1.3.2 Are non-dom reliefs fair
  - 1.3.3 Is a remittance basis fair
- 1.4 Domicile as fiscal test
- 1.5 Non-dom tax reform
- 1.6 Non-dom tax reform history
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- 1.7 Approach to assessment of reform
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  - 1.8.2 Benefit to UK economy
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- 1.9 2017 domicile reform: Assessment
  - 1.9.1 Political background
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- 1.10 The promise of stability
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  - 1.11.3 Alternatives to Framework
- 1.12 The future

## 1.1 Introduction

The topics of this chapter are:

- (1) Policy arguments for and against a lighter tax regime for foreign domiciliaries (or some similar class of footloose individuals)<sup>1</sup>

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1 For discussion on policy issues, see STEP, “Residence and Domicile: Response to Background Paper” (2003)  
[http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Domicile\\_reform\\_STEP\\_response.pdf](http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Domicile_reform_STEP_response.pdf)  
CIOT, “Reviewing the Residence and Domicile Rules” (2003)  
<http://www.tax.org.uk/Resources/CIOT/Migrated%20Resources/j-l/j-jenkins-esq.pdf>  
CIOT, “PBRN18 (Residence & Domicile Review)” (2007)  
<http://www.tax.org.uk/tax-policy/public-submissions/2007/pbrn-18-residence-and-domicile-review>

- (2) A brief history of domicile tax reform
- (3) An assessment of the reforms of
  - (a) 2008
  - (b) 2017
- (4) State of UK tax reform, and prospects for the future

## 1.2 Tax competition

All UK residents have some choice where to reside, but foreign domiciled individuals are in general less securely attached to the UK. Tax competition arguments claim that if their tax burden was as great as that of a UK domiciliary, fewer would choose to live in the UK, and overall the UK economy would lose:

- (1) directly, from tax paid by the foreign domiciliaries (including VAT); and
- (2) indirectly, from investment and expenditure in the UK which is more likely to be made by UK residents.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, UK firms competing in the global market for talent and expertise will find recruitment easier if the tax regime for foreign employees is lighter. Some potential employees would not choose, or could not afford, to come if the UK tried to tax them as it does its own domiciliaries.

In a nutshell: the argument is that the UK economy benefits from foreign domiciliary reliefs.

### 1.2.1 *Tax competition: analysis*

Tax competition raises a number of distinct sub-issues, in particular:

- (1) To assess the existence and importance of tax competition
- (2) What the UK should do in the light of tax competition
- (3) What international agreements might do to regulate tax competition

The first question is essentially one of fact; the second is a question of domestic politics. The third is a matter of foreign politics.

In principle there are many low-tax or preferential tax regimes where wealthy individuals may choose to reside.<sup>3</sup> Switzerland, for instance, has

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2 Except to the extent that tax makes investment by UK resident foreign domiciliaries difficult, as to which, see 13.23 (Remittance investment relief: Critique).

3 In 2017, Italy introduced a fixed levy in lieu of tax on foreign income of new residents: art.24-bis [Italy] *Testo unico delle imposte sui redditi*; as there is no further tax on remittance, this seems much more favourable than the UK system. Daniel

a lump sum taxation regime for non-Swiss citizens, specifically targeted for this purpose and more favourable than the UK remittance basis.<sup>4</sup> Ireland retains the pre-2008 remittance basis.

In assessing the existence and strength of international tax competition several points must be borne in mind.

Effective low tax may be achieved in other countries by relaxing legal provisions at administrative level, in a non-transparent way.

One-paragraph summaries of a country's tax system are bound to be misleading.

The terms of statutory tax law are only one aspect of tax competition. Compliance costs are important. The quality of tax administration is important. An OECD study identifies six desiderata: a developed legal system, confidentiality, impartiality, proportionality, responsiveness (meaning a CRM for large companies, and at least answering correspondence from other taxpayers) and competence. They add:

Frequent changes in legislation, particularly where there has been an absence of consultation, can have an adverse impact on the taxpayers and their advisers trust in the tax system.<sup>5</sup>

But there are others: can a tax authority subject an individual to an expensive and intrusive tax investigation without evidence that tax returns were wrong? Certainty is very important.<sup>6</sup> Perception matters as much as reality. Rates of tax on UK source income may matter more than the rules for foreign domiciliaries. By many of these measures, the UK competes poorly.

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Simon also singled out Spain, Portugal and France: *Tax Journal* (21 July 2017).

4 See 7.5.3 (Swiss forfait taxpayer). This was at one time politically controversial; it was abolished in Zurich in 2009 and 5 other cantons followed suit. But in a referendum in 2014, the regime was supported by 59% of voters, on a 49% turnout; see Sigg and Luongo, "The Swiss lump-sum taxation regime: after the storm comes the calm?" [2015] *JITTCP* 169;

<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/bloomberg/swiss-say-foreign-millionaires-are-still-welcome-after-tax-vote/41144174>

So I expect that Swiss tax law is now stable. In the 2014/15 edition of this work I added "and probably more stable than in the UK" and that proved to be correct!

5 "Engaging with High Net Worth Individuals on Tax Compliance" (2009) para 208 and 243; see

[http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_33749\\_42902277\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3746,en_2649_33749_42902277_1_1_1_1,00.html).

6 See 2.5 (The rule of law).

### 1.2.2 *Other tax competition*

The debate about international tax competition is long standing.<sup>7</sup> Tax competition arises in many areas of taxation, and affects different types of income in different ways.

In areas where investment by non-residents is (more or less) completely mobile, tax competition has driven UK tax rates down to zero. Examples include:

- (1) Interest arising to non-residents on UK bank deposits (and other cases where there is no withholding tax on interest)
- (2) Trading income arising to non-residents from investment management
- (3) IHT on UK funds held by foreign domiciliaries<sup>8</sup>

In the case of very mobile sources of income, such as interest on bank deposits and trading income from asset management, any UK tax charge would only cause the non-resident investor to move the investments to a different jurisdiction with a resultant loss in economic activity and profits in the UK.

In the corporate field, tax competition has reduced the rate of CT, though not of course to zero or near it. Tax competition may not be the only factor which contributes to the reduction in CT rates, but if HM Treasury is to be believed, it is one of the important factors. In the 2017 spring budget:

3.11 The UK is one of the most open economies in the world, and a highly competitive business tax regime remains a key factor in retaining that position. The UK's corporate tax rate is the lowest in the G20.<sup>9</sup>

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7 See the evidence of Lord Vestey to the 1920 Royal Commission, [http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Vestey\\_Royal\\_Commission\\_evidence\\_and\\_ensuing\\_debate.pdf](http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Vestey_Royal_Commission_evidence_and_ensuing_debate.pdf)

8 See 70.3 (Non-settled UK funds). Another example from the field of shipping: "The location of ownership, flagging (registration) and management activities is very 'footloose', since it can easily be transferred from one country to another. This makes it vital to have regard to the fiscal regimes in other countries if we want to maintain a successful shipping industry in the UK. The modern armoury in the battle for success invariably includes a virtually tax-exempt fiscal regime." (Independent Enquiry into a Tonnage Tax, Lord Alexander, HM Treasury 1999.) Another example is the exemptions for major sports events; see s.48 FA 2014. These events would not be held in the UK in the absence of tax exemption.

9 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/spring-budget-2017-documents>  
This is the latest in a line of similar statements, traced in the 2016/17 edition of this work para 1.2.2, but I omit that here as it has diminishing contemporary significance.



But headline rates are only part of the story, and if one looks deeper, a different (and more complex) picture emerges, having regard to other major changes to corporate taxation:

- (1) reduced capital allowances<sup>10</sup>
- (2) increase in taxation of dividends in 2016 (though perhaps this is not relevant to tax competition, as it does not apply to non-residents)

### 1.2.3 *Tax competition within UK*

Devolution raises the issue of tax competition within the UK. Debate has focused on the possibility that Scotland and Northern Ireland may compete in the corporate field, by a lower corporation tax rate than England:

a lower headline rate of corporation tax could encourage greater investment by Scottish and UK firms in both physical and human capital and in research and development within Scotland.

At the same time, it could make the country more attractive as a location for multi-national investment. It could also act as an important signal to global companies and investors as to Scotland's ambition to be a location for competitive business.<sup>11</sup>

Similar issues apply to taxation of individuals. SNP said "We back the 50p top rate of tax across the UK" but decided not to do it in Scotland

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10 See Pomerleau, "What We Can Learn from the UK's Corporate Tax Cuts" (July 2017) <https://taxfoundation.org/can-learn-uks-corporate-tax-cuts/>

11 See "Corporation Tax: Discussion Paper Options for Reform" (2011), <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/919/0120786.pdf>

"Devolution of tax powers to the Scottish Parliament - Commons Library Standard Note" (Published 2012, 2013) <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05984>  
The consultation paper does not consider the possibility that England might match the Scottish lower rate and does not address the question of what constitutes a Scottish company for the purpose of the lower rate.

Likewise in Northern Ireland: HM Treasury, "Rebalancing the Northern Ireland economy" (March 2011)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/190154/condoc\\_responses\\_rebalancing\\_ni\\_economy.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/190154/condoc_responses_rebalancing_ni_economy.pdf)

Wales would also like to join in:

"If Northern Ireland is allowed to cut corporation tax, it would be outrageous if Welsh politicians did not have the option of doing the same"

Gerald Holtham, chair of the Holtham Commission for Wales (Cited in the Scottish consultation paper).

So we may have no shortage of corporation tax competition within the UK.

alone, as that was likely to cost money.<sup>12</sup>

Competition in the foreign domicile field is therefore only one aspect of much wider topic.

#### 1.2.4 *Attitudes to tax competition*

Most though not all commentators would accept that tax competition is an important consideration in framing UK taxation.

Tax competition offers advantages to countries which compete successfully and disadvantages to those who do not. In many areas government have accepted the challenge of competition, and sometimes with enthusiasm:

The [investment manager] exemption enables non-residents to appoint UK-based investment managers without the risk of UK taxation and is one of the key components of the UK's continuing attraction for investment managers.<sup>13</sup>

Those opposed to the consequences of this line of argument deride it as:

- (1) a “race to the bottom”<sup>14</sup>; and
- (2) “harmful” tax competition

It is correct that tax competition should logically drive tax rates on the mobile sources of income of non-residents down to zero, and in some cases that has been the result. Of course tax competition is not the only consideration in forming tax policy.

The expression “harmful tax competition” conceals awkward questions about harmful to whom? The focus is often on harm to the G7 countries.<sup>15</sup>

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12 [http://www.snp.org/our\\_income\\_tax\\_plans\\_explained](http://www.snp.org/our_income_tax_plans_explained)

The Scottish Government, unlike HMRC, publish the background analysis: “The impact of an increase in the additional rate of income tax from 45p to 50p Scotland” (2016) <http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0049/00497818.pdf>

But 2018 sees the Scots rates nudge up to 46%: see

13 SP 1/01; see 50.1 (Investment manager exemptions).

14 This metaphor goes back at least to OECD *Harmful Competition* (1998)

<http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf>

The problem is not unique to tax: international regulatory competition may also lead to a “race to the bottom”; but perhaps in areas outside tax it is easier to reach international agreements imposing minimum standards.

15 See Littlewood, “Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?” in Asif Qureshi and Xuan Gao, eds, *Critical Concepts in Law: International Economic Law*, Routledge, London (2010) volume VI, 162-234; reprinted from (2004) 26 *Michigan Journal of*

Most sober commentators recognise that the UK could not act alone, as if there were no such thing as international tax competition.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, it is always hard to predict what will be the overall economic effect of any reform, and predictions reflect the views and wishes of the partial pundits who make them.<sup>17</sup> Ascertaining the effect of reforms after they are made is scarcely less difficult.

### 1.2.5 Tax competition: EU-law

The freedom of the UK to enter into tax competition against other countries is subject to certain constraints of EU and international law and politics. International fiscal co-operation in this area at present operates only to a limited extent, but it has made some progress in a (non-binding) EU code of conduct on business taxation.<sup>18</sup>

State Aid rules also impose restrictions on UK's freedom to tax and untax.<sup>19</sup>

The EC has expressed disapproval of the remittance basis:

The Commission does not advocate remittance base taxation, as it may (?) lead to double non-taxation.<sup>20</sup>

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International Law 411-487

<http://www.law.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/law/shared/about/our%20staff/academic%20staff/files/Michael%20Littlewood/Tax%20competition.pdf>

Avi-Yonah "Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State" [2000] Harvard Law Review p.1573.

16 However at the extreme even this is denied; eg "Tackle Tax Avoidance" a campaign of Progress (which describes itself as a New Labour pressure group):

"There is real fear at the heart of government that if it gets tough on business, businesses will flee the UK. But as the chief executive of Google, Eric Schmidt, himself admitted in an interview: 'Google will continue to invest in the UK no matter what you guys do because the UK is just too important for us.'

<http://www.progressonline.org.uk/campaigns/tackle-tax-avoidance/articles/> (accessed 2013).

17 For instance, HMRC estimate that a reduction in the rate of Corporation Tax in Scotland to 12.5% would cost £2.6bn, but the Scottish Parliament say the impact will be positive: "Corporation Tax: Discussion Paper Options for Reform" (2011) p.43, <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/919/0120786.pdf>.

The reductions in the UK corporation tax rates from 2012 may be partly motivated by anticipation of Scottish tax competition, though this was tactfully not mentioned.

18 [http://ec.europa.eu/taxation\\_customs/taxation/company\\_tax/harmful\\_tax\\_practices/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm)

19 See 69.19 (State aid).

20 Kovács (EU Taxation and Customs Commissioner 2004 - 2010) IP/07/445 (2007).

That did not seem to have had any impact on UK domestic politics. But the issue is ongoing. In 2018 the European Parliament set up a committee on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance whose remit includes to assess national schemes providing tax privileges for new residents.<sup>21</sup> What (if anything) may result, and how it may impact on the UK post-Brexit, remain unpredictable; though it seems safe to say that nothing will happen soon.

### 1.2.6 *International tax law reform*

Since tax competition extends beyond the EU, and EU powers in relation to tax are (to say the least) politically controversial, those hoping for a body to curb international tax competition tend to look to OECD.<sup>22</sup> At present this is focussed on corporate rather than personal taxation.<sup>23</sup>

### 1.2.7 *“Customers” of HMRC*

In the 2010/11 edition of this work I summarised the tax competition argument thus:

Where there is tax competition, the term “customer”, which HMRC have (controversially) applied to taxpayers since 2001<sup>24</sup> is slightly less inapt. UK resident foreign domiciliaries are in principle more free than other taxpayers to take their “custom” elsewhere.

As far as I am aware, no other Revenue department in the world calls its taxpayers “customers” and it is interesting to digress for a moment to consider what the word implies for the taxpayer/HMRC relationship.

It appears to suggest that the relationship should be based on the market, but what does that entail? A person who regards himself as a customer (as opposed, say, to a “citizen”) has no disposition to put public good ahead of private interest, and no moral relationship with their supplier. Customers control producers of commodities only by buying or not buying as they

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21 <http://www.sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/adopted-taxe3-mandate-2018-02-08.pdf>

22 Eg Jeffrey Sachs “Stop this race to the bottom on corporate tax” Financial Times, March 28 2011.

23 See 2.10.3 (BEPS).

24 A press release at the time provided: (14/06/01) “M and C Saatchi, a leading advertising agency, has been appointed by the IR to rebrand the department. Branding and design consultants, Corporate Edge, will also be working with the IR and M and C Saatchi to ‘create a customer driven department’.”

like.

Rowan Williams (Archbishop of Canterbury, 2003-2012) observes how the language of the market has expanded beyond a market context:

The language of customer and provider has wormed its way into practically all areas of our social life, even education and healthcare, and we forget that it is a metaphor when we call a student, a patient or a traveller a “customer”. The implication is that the most basic relation between one human being and another or one group and another is that of the carefully calibrated exchange of material resources; the most basic kind of assessment we can make about the actions of another, from the trader to the nurse to the politician, is the evaluation of how much they can increase my liberty to negotiate favourable deals and maximize my resources.<sup>25</sup>

But this is not of course the inference which HMRC intend. Sir Nicholas Montagu (Chair of the Board of Inland Revenue, 1997-2004) said that the reason for the change was to remind Revenue staff that the needs of the consumer of public services should be considered first.<sup>26</sup>

The usage has not caught on outside HMRC:

- (1) A sensitivity to language (or some readers may think, a sense of the ridiculous) prevents the parliamentary drafter from using the expression: for instance the SRT consistently uses the term “taxpayer”.
- (2) The Tribunal has commented:

I note in passing that all the reports mentioned below refer to HMRC’s ‘customers’. While this is a regrettable misuse of language by HMRC as it implies people have a choice whether to interact with HMRC and that therefore the payment of taxes is voluntary, nevertheless it is clear that references to ‘customers’ are meant to be references to taxpayers. Needless to say the payment of taxes is not voluntary despite the misnomer ....<sup>27</sup>

- (3) In the 2017/18 edition of this work, I said:

The terminology will not cease to give rise to derision as long as the

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25 Williams, “Knowing our Limits” in Williams and Elliott (eds), *Crisis and Recovery: Ethics, Economics and Justice* (2010), p.20.

26 See “The Customer is always right” Tax Advisor, (February 2003).

27 *LH Bishop Electric Co v HMRC* [2013] UKFTT 522 (TC) at [234].

current generation of tax practitioners remain in practice<sup>28</sup>... It is conceivable that the terminology will last until a future generation sees nothing to laugh at in expressions such as “*penalties designed to change customer behaviour*”<sup>29</sup> but I think that unlikely. Perhaps at some point it will be dropped.

But the HMRC view is unchanged, even defiant:

Mr Troup [HMRC chair] defended HMRC’s sometimes controversial description of taxpayers as ‘customers’ saying that he genuinely believes the tax authority is a customer-centric business.<sup>30</sup>

Looking back on this debate after almost two decades, the reader’s irritation may have faded over time to weary cynicism. It seems at present that HMRC will continue to use it, taxpayers will not adopt it, and we must leave it there.

Underlying this debate on terminology, and perhaps concealed by it, are deeper issues, linguistic, normative and factual:

- What (if anything) do HMRC mean by “customer-centric”?<sup>31</sup>
- Should HMRC seek to be “customer-centric”?<sup>32</sup>

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28 See Cameron, “Customer Service?” *Taxation Magazine*, 10 Apr 2008, p.361: “It never ceases to amaze me that HMRC have adopted the word ‘customer’ to describe the taxpaying public. A customer is someone who chooses to patronise a business.” Andy Wells agrees: “I will never be a ‘customer’ of HMRC. This disregard for the English language irks just about every tax professional I come across...” *Taxation Magazine*, 4 June 2009, p.549. Similarly Anthony Thomas (then president of CIOT): “HMRC now refer to taxpayers as customers, but they do not treat them as customers”; “We need Trust”, *Taxation Magazine*, 2 June 2011, p.7; Truman, “Still Not a Customer” *Taxation Magazine*, 14 June 2012, p.8.

29 [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/e-learning/New\\_Penalties\\_Awareness/Inaccuracy\\_Pen\\_ext/HTML/Inaccuracy\\_Pen\\_ext\\_106.html](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/e-learning/New_Penalties_Awareness/Inaccuracy_Pen_ext/HTML/Inaccuracy_Pen_ext_106.html).

30 <https://www.tax.org.uk/media-centre/blog/other-areas/departing-thoughts-hmrc-chair-edward-troup> (December 2017).

31 “Customer-centric” is a well established marketing term. I do not know when it first arose, but books with “CustomerCentric” in the title date at least back to 2003. One definition is: “Customer centric is a way of doing business with your customer in a way that provides a positive customer experience before and after the sale in order to drive repeat business, customer loyalty and profits.” In the context of HMRC’s “business” the usage, as Rowan Williams says, is best regarded as a vivid metaphor, such metaphors often hinder clarity of thought.

32 Section 1 TMA 1970 provides that HMRC are “responsible for the collection and management” of IT/CT/CGT; which one might think a different matter. See too

- To what extent are HMRC actually “customer-centric”?

On the third, factual, question: One might think it is not a customer-centric policy to insist on a term to which the majority of taxpayer/customers object. The change of terminology from taxpayer to “customer” came at a time which saw a substantial increase in HMRC’s enthusiasm for civil and criminal penalties<sup>33</sup> which is also difficult to regard as customer-centric.<sup>34</sup>

Probably the terminology is (more or less) meaningless spin, with no substance or reality (except, conceivably, a vague aspiration). That is not necessarily a criticism: presentation and perception are important aspects of tax administration.

If that is right, the discussion above is somewhat over-intellectualised. But it is good to have paused and to know what we are talking about.

### 1.3 Fairness

The other consideration in the assessment of foreign domicile taxation is fairness.

#### 1.3.1 *What is fairness*

The starting point for any serious discussion of fairness in tax is terminology from economics rather than law:

- (1) “**Horizontal equity**”, the view that people who are relevantly equal

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100.13.1 (HMRC/taxpayer relationship).

33 “The Department expects the new [civil] penalty regime to result in higher penalties as the minimum penalty for deliberate evasion and concealment is 50%. The Department should track the level of penalties imposed to ensure that it is applying the new regime rigorously.” House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, “HM Revenue & Customs: Managing civil tax investigations” (2011) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpubacc/765/76502.htm>

“We have recruited an additional 200 criminal investigators to increase the number of people prosecuted for tax evasion from 165 in 2010 to 2011, to 565 in 2012 to 2013, and to 1,165 in 2014 to 2015.”

<https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-tax-evasion-and-avoidance>

The wisdom (and cost/benefit) of the vast increase in prosecutions has never been the subject of public debate.

34 House of Commons Treasury Committee, “Administration and effectiveness of HMRC” Sixteenth Report of Session 2010–12 at 143: “we question whether a strategy focused around shifting customers’ behaviour can truly be described as customer-centric.”

should pay the same amount of tax.

- (2) “**Vertical equity**”, the view that people who are relevantly different should pay different amounts of tax, which leads to the (more or less) accepted view that fair taxation should be progressive rather than regressive.

Economists have developed these concepts with considerable sophistication<sup>35</sup> but their limitations are exposed when one tries to apply them in a real life context, such as an assessment of the fairness of the taxation of foreign domiciliaries. The concept of horizontal equity is not so much a definition of fairness as an approach to identifying the issues. In deciding whether one group (foreign domiciliaries, say) is fairly taxed, one needs to identify another group by way of comparison (UK domiciliaries, say) and ask if they are relevantly equal.

### 1.3.2 *Are non-dom reliefs fair*

In the author’s view, domicile is in general a useful and practical measure of UK linkage, and to regard UK and foreign domiciled residents as completely equivalent is facile. Or put the other way, foreign domicile does constitute a significantly weaker UK link than UK domicile. Accordingly conferring a lighter UK tax regime on foreign domiciliaries, such as a remittance basis, is indeed fair. This is especially so bearing in mind that:

- (1) Residence alone does not require a very close connection to the UK.<sup>36</sup>
- (2) A foreign domiciliary may not have had a fair opportunity to arrange their affairs with UK tax in mind; for instance creating settlements from which they were excluded.
- (3) Another consideration is the impracticality (both for taxpayers and HMRC) of untangling ownership of assets, especially in family ownership arrangements which are common in third world countries.

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35 For a starting point, see Kaplow, “Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle” National Tax Journal 42, no. 2 (1989) p.139-55

<http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/42/2/ntj-v42n02p139-54-horizontal-equity-measures-search.pdf>

Musgrave “Horizontal Equity Once More” National Tax Journal 43, no. 2 (1990) p.113-23

<http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/43/2/ntj-v43n02p113-22-horizontal-equity-once-more.pdf>

36 Though the SRT has mitigated the worst excesses of the pre-2013 (common law) residence test.



This view is not universally held. Some maintain that any distinction (for IT or CGT) between UK residents based on domicile is unfair. The two are relevantly equal. It is difficult to see how the dispute between the rival views can be judged, or what either side could do or say to convince the other. The concept of fairness is insufficiently precise to resolve the dispute. One might say that it comes down to a matter of impression, or politics; which is to say the same thing.

Those who advocate this view most strongly are not tax practitioners, and I think would be surprised to find how little is required to be UK resident: their views are based on a paradigm of a foreign domiciliary who is a very long-term UK resident (at least). Thus the Guardian front page offered the heading:

“We’ll end non-dom status”- Miliband. All who live *permanently* in UK will pay all their tax here.<sup>37</sup>

Similarly, in Ireland, which has similar rules, a Commission on Taxation report argued:

Equity requires that taxpayers who are in a comparable situation should be afforded the same treatment for tax purposes. Making a distinction between individuals based on their domicile results in a situation where taxpayers who are otherwise in a comparable situation are treated for tax purposes in different ways. This is inequitable. Thus, for example, an individual who, although domiciled outside of Ireland, is a *permanent resident* should be treated the same as any other resident taxpayer. The special treatment afforded to individuals who are resident, but not domiciled, in Ireland whereby they are only taxable in Ireland on foreign source income and capital gains to the extent that the income and gains are remitted to Ireland is inequitable and should be discontinued.<sup>38</sup>

To repeal the remittance basis altogether in order to tax “permanent residents” (however that expression is defined) is to throw out the baby with the bathwater. To restrict the remittance basis to those who are not

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37 Guardian 8 April 2015. Similarly, perhaps, the Labour Manifesto 2015: “we will abolish non-dom status so that all those who make the UK their home pay tax in the same way as the rest of us.” But the words “make the UK their home” may mean little or much.

38 [Ireland] Commission on Taxation Report (2009) para 6.2.2  
<https://www.kpmg.com/IE/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Tax/COT.pdf>

“permanent residents” requires thought to be given to a definition of the term.

It has to be said that in political debate, depth of analysis is not to be expected; assessment of fairness is visceral, and sensitive ears might detect elements of class or wealth hostility and xenophobia.

### 1.3.3 *Is a remittance basis fair*

Even if it is accepted that it is fair to tax foreign domiciliaries less than UK domiciliaries, the question of what constitutes a fair reduction is a distinct and more difficult issue. The 2008 reforms accepted the principle of a distinction (which is why they did not go far enough for some commentators) but reduced the extent of the tax reduction by making the remittance basis less attractive.

The remittance basis of taxation is a form of qualified non-taxation. In assessing its fairness it is relevant to compare different groups of foreign domiciliaries:

- (1) *Short-term residents* who are:
  - (a) wealthy individuals, who can elect for the remittance basis and are able to retain (or spend) significant foreign income/gains abroad, and
  - (b) less wealthy individuals for whom the remittance basis offers little or no benefit since they have no foreign income/gains, or cannot afford to retain (or spend) much foreign income/gains abroad.
- (2) *Long-term residents*
  - (a) ultra-wealthy individuals, who can elect for the remittance basis and are able to retain significant foreign income/gains abroad, and
  - (b) less wealthy individuals for whom the remittance basis does not justify paying the remittance basis charge.

The effective rate of tax under the remittance basis approximately declines with income and it can be described as regressive taxation. If one accepts that taxation ought in principle to be progressive, which has always been a broad feature of UK taxation, then there is a sound argument that the remittance basis is unfair.

What effect did the 2008 reforms have in this area? So far as they decreased the attractiveness of the remittance basis by withdrawal of personal reliefs as a cost of the remittance basis they have decreased the unfairness.

So far as they have introduced the remittance basis claim charge, the

reforms have targeted the benefit of the remittance basis at a small number of ultra-wealthy individuals. That may make sense under the tax competition argument, but from a fairness point of view it is difficult to justify.

#### **1.4 Domicile as fiscal test**

The domicile concept is not ideally framed to identify the “footloose” individuals, whose UK links are sufficiently less that a lighter tax regime is appropriate on fairness or tax competition arguments. The adhesive quality of a domicile of origin, and the restrictive rules for the acquisition of a domicile of choice, allow some fortunate individuals to enjoy foreign domicile tax treatment, despite very close UK links and only tenuous, historical and fortuitous links to their domicile of origin. To the extent that they do so the current tax system fails both on economic and fairness criteria.

In considering this objection to domicile, however, one should bear in mind that no perfect criteria exists: the question is not whether domicile always produces the right answer, but whether one can do significantly better with other concepts or refinements.

Other concepts are sometimes used:

- (1) Long term residence, of which UK tax uses a variety of tests:
  - (a) Deemed domicile: 15 years residence
  - (b) Remittance basis claim charge: 7 and 12 years residence
  - (c) Temporary non-residence: 4 years residence and 5 years absence
  - (d) Arriver/leaver rules for residence & OWR: 3 years residence
- (2) Citizenship (not much used in UK domestic tax law but used in OECD Model treaty and some IHT DTAs)

These are all alternative ways to make the distinction between UK residents with strong and weaker UK links; whether they would serve better than a domicile test seems to me rather doubtful. The 2017 deemed domicile rules take us down this path, but the rules for protected trusts means that common law domicile will continue to be important.

#### **1.5 Non-dom tax reform**

It is helpful to distinguish different ways of altering the tax system for foreign domiciliaries:

- (1) Alter the definition of domicile for general purposes and so alter the class who qualify for foreign domicile tax treatment. Of course this

would have ramifications beyond tax. Those proposing reforms of this kind are not usually motivated by tax – though those objecting to them may be.<sup>39</sup>

- (2) Alter the definition of foreign domicile for some or all tax purposes.
- (3) Alter tax laws applying to all foreign domiciliaries.
- (4) Identify subclasses of foreign domiciliaries with close UK links so as to tax them more heavily than foreign domiciliaries with less close UK links.

One can of course achieve the same end result by more than one technique. There is a lot to be said for approach (4) both on economic and fairness grounds.

## 1.6 Non-dom tax reform history<sup>40</sup>

The chequered history reflects the difficulty, or impossibility, of reconciling incompatible policy considerations.

### 1.6.1 1974-2002

The 1974 Finance Bill included a provision (clause 18) that an individual ordinarily resident in the UK for 5 out of 6 years should be deemed UK domiciled for IT and CGT purposes. By the time the clause came to be debated, the Labour (Wilson) administration proposed to amend it so that individuals resident for 9 years out of 10 years were deemed UK domiciled.<sup>41</sup> But even after this concession, the clause did not survive to the Finance Act.<sup>42</sup>

The 1988 Consultative Document (Residence in the UK) made radical proposals. The remittance basis would be abolished. Those resident here for less than seven out of 14 years (and, perhaps, who are also not UK domiciled) would qualify for a new “intermediate basis” of taxation. This

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39 See 3.18.2 (Burden of proof and procedure).

40 See too 11.2 (History of remittance basis).

41 Hansard, Finance Bill debate 9 May 1974.

42 For an account of the lobbying behind this, see Barnett, *Inside The Treasury* (1982) p.28–9. For the Parliamentary debate, see HC Deb 13 June 1974 vol 874 cc1842-948 [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jun/13/cases-i-and-ii-of-schedule-e#S5CV0874P0\\_19740613\\_HOC\\_311](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jun/13/cases-i-and-ii-of-schedule-e#S5CV0874P0_19740613_HOC_311)

It is perhaps relevant to the outcome that the Labour administration was a minority government from 4 March 1974 until the election on 10 October 1974, after which it had a majority of 3 seats.

would require disclosure of worldwide income in order to tax it at an effective rate of 2% or less. This proposal was abandoned.

### 1.6.2 2003 - 2008

In 2002 a newspaper campaign emerged which pressed the Blair administration into action, or at least into the appearance of action. The Budget of April 2003 delivered a “background paper” called “Reviewing the residence and domicile rules as they affect the taxation of individuals”.<sup>43</sup> This was a facile document<sup>44</sup> but it may be unfair to criticise its (unnamed) authors. Their instructions may have been to be uncontroversial; by saying nothing, there was nothing in the document to which anyone could object.

Nothing then happened from 2003 to 2008.<sup>45</sup> It is clear that the review of foreign domicile tax did not follow the normal course of consultation, decision and implementation. In the absence of a frank explanation of what went on, it is tempting to speculate. The likely explanation is that the Blair administration wanted to do nothing, but prevaricated to avoid an announcement which would have led to a furore from those in favour of reform.<sup>46</sup> Blair resigned in June 2007. A change of power led to an unannounced U-turn from that unannounced policy.<sup>47</sup>

## 1.7 Approach to assessment of reform

The 2003 background paper on domicile recited the principles that taxation of foreign domiciliaries should:

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43 [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091222074811/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2003/residence\\_domicile.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091222074811/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2003/residence_domicile.pdf)

44 It contained an outline of the law (a rehash of IR20) and one paragraph summaries of the law of 29 other countries (of insufficient detail to be of any use and generally said to be misleading). The paper did not consider any proposals or their possible impact. It (consciously?) ignored every earlier discussion of reform: the Royal Commissions of 1920 and 1955, the 1936 Codification Committee, the 1974 Finance Bill, the 1987 Law Commission Report and the 1988 Consultation Paper.

For an account of the decline in quality of government white and green papers, see Forster, *British Government in Crisis* (2005), p.134.

45 The history is set out in the 9<sup>th</sup> edition of this work para 1.3.2. The last outing of (by then extremely tired) statement was Hansard 12 July 2007 Col 1605 by which time almost no-one believed it, but by then it was possibly true.

46 See Osborne, *The Rise of Political Lying* (2005).

47 Earlier editions of this work contain a more detailed history of this period, but details seem less important with the passage of time and changes of government.

- [1] be fair;
- [2] support the competitiveness of the UK economy. I think this just means, benefit the economy: “competitiveness” was just the buzzword of the day. The principal benefit must be to raise revenue, though one might, perhaps, look for other more intangible benefits).
- [3] be clear and
- [4] be easy to operate.

Although not mentioned, the principles derive from Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776).<sup>48</sup>

It is naive to recite these principles without noting (as Adam Smith did) that they are to a substantial extent irreconcilable. Mirrlees stated:

- These recommendations may command near-universal support but
- [1] they are not comprehensive, and
  - [2] they do not help with the really difficult questions which arise when one objective is traded off against another.<sup>49</sup>

It is a common feature of HMRC papers to ignore point [2], and to claim the mantles of fairness and competitiveness without acknowledging a conflict between them. Thus the HMRC policy paper “Domicile: Income Tax and CGT”:

The government wants to reform the tax treatment of non-doms so that the UK can continue to benefit from the presence of talented foreigners while also addressing unfair tax outcomes.<sup>50</sup>

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48 Smith *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) Book 5 chapter 2.

<http://www.bibliomania.com/2/1/65/112/frameset.html>

In Scotland, Adam Smith is more highly regarded:

“As with the entire approach the Government takes ... on taxation, these proposals are firmly founded on principles, Scottish (!) principles, that have stood the test of time. Adam Smith in 1776 in his “Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations”, set out four maxims with regard to taxes; the burden proportionate to the ability to pay, certainty, convenience and efficiency of collection.”

Swinney (Finance Secretary) “The Scottish Government’s Approach to Taxation” (2012)

<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/taxation07062012>

49 Mirrlees, *Tax By Design* (2011) p.22

<http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/mirrleesreview/design/ch2.pdf>

50 Feb 2016,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/domicile-income-tax-and-capital-gains-tax/domicile-income-tax-and-capital-gains-tax>

This is the Janet and John approach to tax reform.

The House of Commons Treasury Committee provide an intelligent approach to assessment of tax reform, identifying 8 criteria:

The Committee recommends that tax policy should be measured by reference to the following principles. Tax policy should:

1. **be fair.** We accept that not all commentators will agree on the detail of what constitutes a fair tax, but a tax system which is considered to be fundamentally unfair will ultimately fail to command consent.

2. **support growth and encourage competition.**

3. **provide certainty.** In virtually all circumstances the application of the tax rules should be certain. It should not normally be necessary for anyone to resort to the courts in order to resolve how the rules operate in relation to his or her tax affairs. **Certainty about tax requires**

i. **legal clarity:** Tax legislation should be based on statute and subject to proper democratic scrutiny by parliament.

ii. **Simplicity:** The tax rules should aim to be simple, understandable and clear in their objectives.

iii. **Targeting:** It should be clear to taxpayers whether or not they are liable for particular types of charges to tax. When anti-avoidance legislation is passed, due regard should be had to maintaining the simplicity and certainty of the tax system.

4. **provide stability.** Changes to the underlying rules should be kept to a minimum and policy shocks should both be avoided. There should be a justifiable economic and/or social basis for any change to the tax rules and this justification should be made public and the underlying policy made clear.

5. The Committee also considers that it is important that a person's tax liability should be easy to calculate and straightforward and cheap to collect. To this end, tax policy should be **practicable.**

6. The tax system as a whole must be **coherent.** New provisions should complement the existing tax system, not conflict with it.

The Committee acknowledge that these objects are incompatible:

85. No tax system is, or can be, static. There will always be trade-offs and difficult decisions; a desire for fairness may increase complexity; a desire for certainty may increase administrative complexity. Nonetheless, the principles we set out, which reflect a surprising degree of convergence within our evidence, give a direction of travel which, in the long run, can both secure consent and improve the performance of the

economy.<sup>51</sup>

I think Adam Smith would be content with that.

## **1.8 2008 reform: Assessment**

The 2008 reforms increased the tax burden on foreign domiciliaries in four main ways:

- (1) Remittance basis claim charge for long-term residents
- (2) Withdrawal of personal allowances for remittance basis claimants
- (3) ITA remittance basis, stricter than the pre-2008 remittance basis
- (4) Extension of anti-avoidance provisions to remittance basis taxpayers (in particular, the s.720, s.13 and s.87 remittance bases, and the AIP remittance basis)

### *1.8.1 Clear and easy to operate*

It will be evident to anyone who skims this volume that the 2008 rules are a failure by this criteria. The rules are unclear, often difficult and sometimes impossible to operate. In these respects they are unquestionably worse than the pre-2008 rules.

Government policy normally requires an impact assessment.<sup>52</sup> None was carried out in relation to any of the 2008 reforms. Many features of the reforms could not have survived if it had been.

### *1.8.2 Benefit to UK economy*

On one side of the account is the gain of more tax paid by foreign domiciliaries. On the other is:

- (1) Tax and investment lost from individuals who leave the UK, and those who (because of the reforms) decide not to come.
- (2) The loss to the economy that the 2008 rules in many cases discourage or prevent investment in the UK and prevent use of UK services.

In the 2008/09 edition of this work my initial assessment was as follows:

Overall it seems to me implausible that the reforms will make a positive contribution to the UK economy. One can test the matter this way. If a wealthy individual, a beneficiary of offshore trusts created by himself or his family, asked for advice on the desirability of choosing the UK as a

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51 Treasury “Principles of tax policy” (2011)

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/emtreasy/753/753.pdf>

52 [http://old.tax.org.uk/ciot\\_media/themakingoftaxlaw.pdf](http://old.tax.org.uk/ciot_media/themakingoftaxlaw.pdf)



residence, what would one say? Even now the individual could still do worse; and if enough advance planning and restructuring is possible, the problems may be ameliorated, at an administrative cost. Thus tax may still not prevent an individual from coming to the UK if he wants to sufficiently. Also, the old cliché about the tax tail and the commercial dog still holds good. But all this is a far cry from the pre-2008 position, where one would simply respond that the UK was clearly a desirable place to reside.<sup>53</sup>

The 2008 reforms did not in the event greatly reduce the non-dom population, though they may have reduced it slightly.

HMRC offer the following statistics:<sup>54</sup>

**Remittance basis claimants<sup>55</sup>**

	<i>Total 000's</i>	<i>Tax paid<sup>56</sup> £billion</i>	<i>Rem basis charge payers 000s</i>	<i>Tax paid £billion</i>	<i>Tax per rem basis payer £100k</i>
2007-08	no data				
2008-09	48	5.3	5.4	1.9	350
2009-10	46	5.8	5.2	2.1	406
2010-11	49	6.3	5.5	1.9	343
2011-12	49	6.6	5.5	1.8	326
2012-13	48	6.5	5.1	1.8	352
2013-14	53	6.9	5.0	2.1	421
2014-15	55	6.9	5.1	1.1	412

The figures are interesting; but a proper analysis would require a team with both economic and tax expertise, and so far no such analysis has been published. John Barnett summarises some key facts:

- the non-dom population [including those who do not claim the remittance basis] contributed £9.25bn in income tax, CGT and national insurance contributions in 2014/15
- Each UK resident non-dom paid an average of £105,000 in income tax, CGT and national insurance.
- The average income tax paid by UK resident non-doms was

53 Kessler, *Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries* (7th ed, 2008), pp. 8

54 HMRC, “Statistics on Non-domiciled Taxpayers in the UK 2007-08 to 2014-15” (August 2017)

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/640897/Statistical\\_commentary\\_on\\_non-domiciled\\_taxpayers.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/640897/Statistical_commentary_on_non-domiciled_taxpayers.pdf)

55 Those who fill in SA returns. Those who do not are not counted.

56 IT, CGT and NIC. IHT and VAT and other taxes are not included, though the total amounts may be large.

£76,500; the average income tax paid by taxpayers as a whole was £5,430

- UK resident non-doms paid 3.9 per cent of all income tax (£167 billion) yet represented only 0.2 per cent of the taxpaying population (30.7 million)

The statistics omit to look back at how much tax the changes in 2008 (and 2012) were supposed to bring in. One has to dig back to find these<sup>57</sup> but one discovers that the 2008 reforms were supposed to yield nothing in 2008/09, £700 million in 2009/10 and £500 million in 2010/11. It is not clear whether this was just wrong or can somehow be reconciled with the outturn that the yield fell by £1.2 billion in the first year; and remained £400 million down in the second year; and £300 million in the third year. The 2012 changes<sup>58</sup> were similarly supposed to be neutral and then raise money, but revenues subsequently fell.<sup>59</sup>

Subsequent data may in due course allow an answer to the important question whether the 2017 reforms increase or decrease the tax yield.

### 1.8.3 *Fairness of 2008 reforms*

The FA 2008 contained a wide ranging package of reforms and any short assessment of its merits must be limited to its main features.

The remittance basis claim charge distinguishes between short term and long-term residents, and taxes the latter more heavily, the connecting factor here being the long term residence tests. One cannot categorise those distinctions as unfair.

On the other hand, among long-term foreign domiciliaries, the charge distinguishes between the extremely wealthy (to whom the remittance basis is still attractive) and others (to whom it is not). This offends against the principle of vertical equity, which suggests that people with higher incomes should pay more tax. That is not fair, it represents a decision to prioritise the economic advantage of tax competition by targeting the remittance basis to the wealthiest. The tax competition consideration conflicts with fairness.

The withdrawal of personal allowances as a quid pro quo of a remittance

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57 [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407164623/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud08\\_complereport.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407164623/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/bud08_complereport.pdf) - see p.112.

58 [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110540/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget2012\\_documents.htm](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110540/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/budget2012_documents.htm) - see p.52.

59 <https://www.tax.org.uk/media-centre/blog/media-and-politics/non-dom-stats-important-what-they-don%E2%80%99t-tell-us-what-they-do>

basis is not unfair (though it comes at a cost in terms of complexity).

Of perhaps greater importance is the other aspects of a package of reforms which affect all foreign domiciliaries, not just long-term residents.

The stricter ITA remittance basis is not unfair, except for the wider reaches of the relevant person definition<sup>60</sup> and the supposed rule (probably ignored in practice) that the taxable amount remitted may exceed the value of the asset remitted.<sup>61</sup>

The extended 2008 anti-avoidance rules can work unfairly but complete fairness is impossible to achieve in this area.

The transitional rules were another matter but their significance has faded over time.

All in all, the 2008 reform may be given some limited marks for fairness. This is not to say that the pre-2008 rules should be regarded as unfair: the concept of fairness (especially if viewed with some attention to practicality) is so vague that a very wide range of tax policies may all be categorised as “fair”.

Some of the hardest hit are long-term UK resident US citizens, who pay

- (1) US tax on a citizenship basis and
- (2) substantially greater UK tax liabilities under the 2008 regime with only treaty relief to mitigate double taxation, as far as it goes.

That is unfair, but the reason is not that UK unfairly taxes its long-term residents, but that the US imposes US tax on non-resident citizens, so all its non-residents face the burden of double taxation: US tax and tax in their country of residence (subject to limited tax credit relief). In this respect the US is almost unique. The only other country which taxes worldwide income of non-resident citizens is Eritrea.<sup>62</sup>

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60 See 12.7.1 (Corporate relevant person: Critique); 12.11 (Relevant person rules: Critique).

61 See 12.31.2 (Remittance of derived property).

62 A few countries (i.e. Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Turkey) tax on citizenship, but only for a limited duration or in special cases.

Ironically, in 2011 the United States condemned Eritrea at the United Nations for its “diaspora tax”.

See Hammer, “Old Habits Die Hard: Should the United States Abolish Citizenship-Based Taxation?” (2016), IBFD

[http://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Tax-Portal/White-Papers?utm\\_source=linkedin&utm\\_medium=social-media&utm\\_campaign=linkedin-discussion-week-9&utm\\_content=IBFD-Tax-Portal/White-Papers](http://www.ibfd.org/IBFD-Tax-Portal/White-Papers?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social-media&utm_campaign=linkedin-discussion-week-9&utm_content=IBFD-Tax-Portal/White-Papers)

#### 1.8.4 *Process of implementation*

The manner in which the FA 2008 was introduced deserves to be recorded.

In January 2008, 26 pages of draft clauses were published whose unwritten message to wealthy non-residents was broadly: *do not come to the UK if possible; if you must, do not invest any money here*. The clauses were officially described as work in progress, but this was unfit for publication.

HMRC<sup>63</sup> presumably agreed. On 27 March the Finance Bill was published, containing 54 pages of legislation. The FB clauses bore almost no resemblance to the January draft. One consequence is that the professional time and clients' money spent considering the old clauses was almost entirely wasted. That certainly cost many £millions. Another consequence was that the profession had nine frantic days to scramble around before the end of the tax year. Because of the absence of sensible transitional reliefs, large amounts of tax depended on decisions and actions taken in those days. Sensible consideration of difficult and important matters was rendered impossible.

On the date of publication the Treasury announced that the Finance Bill was incomplete and amendments covering almost every aspect of the rules<sup>64</sup> were made in the course of progress of the Finance Bill.<sup>65</sup> Thirty pages of amendments duly emerged in mid June – far too late in the Finance Bill timetable to give them any serious consideration. Forty eight more Report Stage amendments were published on 26 June. The report stage and third reading (after which no further amendments could be made) were held on 1 and 2 July 2008. Avery Jones notes that “Report Stage

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63 In this work I use the expression HMRC loosely, to include those in HM Treasury and in Government who share the responsibility for tax reform; it is not easy, or necessary, to identify where tax reform decisions are actually made.

64 Explanatory notes to Schedule 7, para 36 (mixed funds); para 47 (s.87 charge); para 52 (non-resident trusts); para 74 (Schedule 4C); para 91 (ToA provisions); para 106 (works of art); para 107 (employment related securities).

65 In the 2008/09 edition I said:

“This is a new development in tax legislation. While from time to time inadequately drafted clauses have always been found in Finance Bills, this is as far as I am aware the first time that the Government has had to announce that fact at the time of publication of the Finance Bill.”

There are similar examples in the FA 2009 but it has not become a trend.

amendments are usually a disaster.”<sup>66</sup>

As a result, the final legislation poses problems which will occupy practitioners, and (so far as they care about the legislation) HMRC, for many years, but it is also noteworthy that during the first three months of 2008/09 taxpayers could not know what laws governed transactions which they might wish to carry out, or what record keeping would be required of them.

The former editor of *Taxation* is blunt:

The standard of strategic policy making at the Treasury has been unacceptably poor in recent years, but this must surely have been one of its lowest ebbs ever.<sup>67</sup>

CIOT say:

when corners are cut, especially under time pressures, there can be serious deficiencies.

and their example to prove the point is the non-domicile rules in the FA 2008.<sup>68</sup>

The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee comment in measured language:

Our private sector witnesses would not have used words like “a real shambles” if they did not feel strongly about this. ...

176. We recommend that, if they have not already done so, HMT and HMRC should carry out a full review of the reasons why there were so many difficulties in the development of this policy initiative. They should ensure that the lessons are learned so that these problems do not emerge in other initiatives.

177. We also recommend that if another policy initiative gets to the point where the legislation cannot be finalised for inclusion in the Finance Bill, that initiative should not be included in the Bill, or, if feasible, the part which is not finalised should not be included. We cannot support the approach of the Finance Bill’s still being subject to much amendment at the time it is published, particularly when the proposals come into effect

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66 See “Taxing Foreign Income from Pitt to the Tax Law Rewrite—The Decline of the Remittance Basis”, Avery Jones in *Studies in the History of Tax Law* (Vol 1 2004) <http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Remittance-basis.pdf>.

67 *Taxation* 12 June 2008 Vol 161 No. 4160 p.627 (Malcolm Gunn).

68 The Making of Tax Law, para 3.2, CIOT, June 2010

<http://www.tax.org.uk/resources/CIOT/Documents/2010/09/themakingoftaxlaw.pdf>

from the beginning of the tax year, as in this case.<sup>69</sup>

No review was carried out.

Does it now matter? Readers may think it pointless to cry “foul” in a game which has no referee, and whose result was long ago declared. But I think the story deserves to be recorded as what Lord Howe described as “an object lesson in how not to legislate”.<sup>70</sup>

## 1.9 2017 domicile reform: Assessment

The 2017 reforms<sup>71</sup> contain a wide ranging package of reforms and any short assessment of its merits must be limited to its main features, which are:

- (1) 15-year deemed domicile rule for IT/CGT
- (2) Formerly domiciled residents rules
- (3) Protected trust regime
- (4) IHT residential-property regime
- (5) Non-resident disregard for s.87 gains

### 1.9.1 *Political background*

The inspiration for the changes was political. The decision did not much depend on an assessment of the policy arguments analysed in this chapter. The decision should be seen in the context of the 2015 summer budget’s adoption of other Labour policies: the increased national living wage<sup>72</sup> and the apprenticeship levy.<sup>73</sup> The Cameron administration sought to occupy middle ground left vacant, or perceived to be vacant, by the Corbyn

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69 Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2nd Report of Session 2007–08, The Finance Bill 2008

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldconaf/117/117i.pdf>.

70 Making Taxes Simpler - The final report of a Working Party chaired by Lord Howe (2008) <http://www.tax-news.com/asp/res/makingtaxessimpler.pdf>.

71 The reforms should be considered as a package with the supplemental offshore trust reforms which were announced together but deferred until 2018.

72 Labour Manifesto 2015 provided: “We will [raise] the National Minimum Wage to more than £8 an hour by October 2019”.

<http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetter-TheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf>

73 Labour Manifesto 2015 provided: “[Apprenticeships] will be co-funded ... by employers...”

<http://www.labour.org.uk/page/-/BritainCanBeBetter-TheLabourPartyManifesto2015.pdf>

opposition.

The Government have shown no interest in debate on the policy issues. Since the policy was taken from the Labour manifesto,<sup>74</sup> and continued to be supported by Labour, there was little possibility of a successful lobby against it.

This is not to say that the 2017 reforms are not defensible, on the basis of fairness or otherwise, just that little reasoned debate took place in public, and probably little debate took place in private. The IFS, as usual, shone an intelligent beam into the fog, though I am not sure that anyone took any notice.<sup>75</sup>

Contrast the 2008 reforms where there was at least the appearance of consultation and debate.

Perhaps it would be naive to expect otherwise.

### 1.9.2 *Clear and easy to operate*

By this criterion the 2017 reforms fail hopelessly.

### 1.9.3 *Fairness*

A 15-year deemed domicile rule for IT/CGT seems fair. The protected trust regime leaves us short of equality between long term foreign domiciled individuals and UK domiciliaries, but that can itself be defended as fair.

Formerly domiciled residents rules can work harshly, but all workable rules must have hard cases at the borders and the number of truly unfair cases will be very small.

The difficulty in assessing the fairness of the IHT residential-property regime is that IHT (unlike, say, CTT) is a fundamentally unfair and illogical tax. I would have thought it reasonably clear that any advantage does not justify the complexity and oddity of the results from the territorial limits of the tax which now apply.

The non-resident disregard will operate unfairly, and significantly extends the unfairness of a code which was already unfair.

### 1.9.4 *Benefit to UK economy*

Perhaps more importantly: Will the reforms benefit the UK economy? The

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<sup>74</sup> See 1.3.2 (Are non-dom reliefs fair).

<sup>75</sup> IFS, "Unknown quantities: Labour's 'non-dom' proposal" (2015)  
<http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7703>

consultation was prefaced with the statement that:

The government wants to attract talented individuals to live in the UK who will help to contribute to the success of this country by investing here and creating jobs. The long-standing tax rules for individuals who are not domiciled in the UK are an important feature of our internationally competitive tax system, and the government remains committed to that aim.<sup>76</sup>

I wonder how far that was meant to be taken seriously. In 1974, when the Conservative successfully opposed a similar reform proposed by Labour, Peter Rees (later Conservative Chief Secretary to the Treasury) said:

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Pembroke (Roger Edwards, now Lord Crickhowell), that very little tax will be gained.<sup>77</sup>

But it was, perhaps, a different computation when income tax rates reached 83% or 98%, and without the protected trust regime.

The 2016 policy paper provides:

The costing has been adjusted to account for behaviour, which includes increased tax planning on offshore income, non-compliance and choosing to become non-UK resident. However, behavioural response for high net worth individuals is difficult to predict.<sup>78</sup>

What is clear is that economic benefit was not a consideration, or at least not a major consideration, behind the reforms. This may also be inferred from the fact that the reforms were announced in the Summer Budget 2015, but no estimate of the tax yield was published until Budget 2016. The budget figures<sup>79</sup> are:

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76 Consultation paper “Reforms to the taxation of non-domiciles” (2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/reforms-to-the-taxation-of-non-domiciles/reforms-to-the-taxation-of-non-domiciles>

77 [http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jun/13/cases-i-and-ii-of-schedule-e#S5CV0874P0\\_19740613\\_HOC\\_311](http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1974/jun/13/cases-i-and-ii-of-schedule-e#S5CV0874P0_19740613_HOC_311)

78 “Domicile: Income Tax and CGT” (Feb 2016)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/domicile-income-tax-and-capital-gains-tax>

79 Budget 2016 (March 2016) Table 2.2

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/508193/HMT\\_Budget\\_2016\\_Web\\_Accessible.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/508193/HMT_Budget_2016_Web_Accessible.pdf)



Year	Deemed domicile	IHT residence-property rules
2016-17	0	-5
2017-18	-20	+30
2018-19	+395	+90
2019-20	+310	+60
2020-21	+310	+70

These figures include an estimate of the effect on the yield caused by those who decide to leave the UK rather than become deemed domiciled here. However, there is no account made for the secondary impacts that the reforms could have, for example, on spending or investment here by those who decide to leave. There is also no allowance made for those who decide not to come to the UK as a result of the reforms. The figures are approved by the Office for Budget Responsibility, which, I am told, considered these effects would not be significant.<sup>80</sup> But it seems to me that these omissions render the table invalid, and the reform is likely to cost more than it saves.

### 1.10 The promise of stability

There is a long tradition of instability in the UK tax system. In 1981:

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the British tax system is that it is under continual change.<sup>81</sup>

In 1993:

The major distinguishing characteristic of the British tax system is its instability. The British tax system changes faster, more frequently, and more radically than any other tax system I have observed.<sup>82</sup>

In 1999:

The UK tax system is caught in a culture of never-ending change.<sup>83</sup>

The years 2008 - 2013 saw a series of broken promises of stability without

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80 Clarified with HM Treasury. The figures are (necessarily) based on the then economic forecasts and also subject to change with future fiscal events, e.g. if the forecasts for wage growth etc. change.

81 James & Nobes, *Economics of Taxation* (1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1981), p.135.

82 Steinmo, *Taxation and Democracy* (1993), p.44.

83 ICAEW TAXGUIDE 4/99 (Towards A Better Tax System)

<http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/tax/towards-a-better-tax-system>

any perceptible change of practice.<sup>84</sup> The promises of stability should be regarded as lip-service to the desideratum of stability. The practice, which lies deep in the culture of government, proved immune to such announcements. A true commitment to stability requires HMRC to refrain from making reforms which they would like to make, and when actual proposals come to the table, the interest of reform overcomes the interest of stability. It is easier for politicians to talk about stability than to achieve it. Perhaps HMRC have recognised this, as the 2014, 2015 budgets contained no further promises of stability. The 2017 budget has only a vague reference to “a more stable and certain tax environment”, and I doubt if anyone is expected to take that seriously.

### **1.11 State of UK tax reform**

In 2010 CIOT expressed itself strongly:

The way tax law is developed and effected in the UK is deeply flawed.<sup>85</sup>

Two publications shed light on what went wrong with tax legislation in recent years. Demos say:

The centralisation of [tax policy-making power] is a particular problem because of the lack of institutional accountability of the Treasury on taxation policy and the lack of accountability of chancellors themselves in matters of taxation. ... The concept of checks and balances in tax policy is nonexistent.

... the current relationship between the Treasury and HMRC was ‘very dysfunctional’, had ‘almost gone as wrong as it could have gone’...

At the moment, pursuing a career only in tax policy is not valued within the Treasury hierarchy. Officials pass through the tax teams rather than making tax policy a career choice. ... High turnover results in a lack of experience in the tax section and little institutional memory...

... There are traditional areas that are ring-fenced as not for consultation, including tax rates and anti-avoidance measures. ...

... ‘at the moment [anti-avoidance] works like a drive-by shooting. You might hit your objective but you also hit a lot of other people.’

At present, policies are frequently changed without understanding the

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84 I set them out the 2016/17 edition of this work para 1.10 (The promise of stability) but omit that here as it has diminishing contemporary significance.

85 Letter from CIOT to George Osborne, 19 May 2010.

impact the policy has initially had in practice.<sup>86</sup>

Along with a tendency not to consult is an HMRC policy which is profoundly hostile to the tax profession. The Director of the HMRC Tax Avoidance Group 2004-2009 records:

... I was never happier than when a new tax avoidance initiative was greeted with howls of protest from the tax avoidance quarter.<sup>87</sup>

In short, preventing avoidance has been a priority that outweighs other considerations, such as certainty, workability and the rule of law; or rather obliterates all consideration; and listening to the tax avoidance quarter – which includes the professional bodies and almost any practitioner who said what HMRC did not want to hear – has been ruled out. The professional bodies are regarded by HMRC as a pressure group whose vaunted commitment to fairness, practicality and the rule of law is merely a cloak for self-interested whingeing of a featherbedded elite.<sup>88</sup>

That policy has ruled since the 1997 Blair administration, and its consequences can be seen in seeking to state the law, as this book seeks to do, or in seeking to understand the law, as you the reader will do now.

### 1.11.1 *Tax Consultation Framework*

In 2011 the coalition administration promised a fresh start with The Tax Consultation Framework. The 2015 Cameron administration also committed to this.<sup>89</sup> It provides:

2. There are five stages to the development and implementation of tax policy:

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86 Ussher and Walford, *National Treasure* (Demos, 2011)

[http://www.demos.co.uk/files/National\\_treasure\\_-\\_web.pdf?1299511925](http://www.demos.co.uk/files/National_treasure_-_web.pdf?1299511925).

Demos claims to be Britain's leading cross-party think-tank.

87 Tailby, "Some Reflections on Tax Avoidance" [2011] PCB 41.

88 This may be seen in the context of a more general antagonism to the legal (and other) professions, and dismissal of their ethical pretensions. That is an ancient trope, but took renewed vigour under Thatcher, and has led to a transfer of regulatory power from the Bar and Law Society to regulation by non-lawyers.

89 HM Treasury: "Tax policy consultation will continue and be strengthened. The government remains committed to consulting on policy as set out in 'The new approach to tax policy making' in 2010." (November 2016).

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-new-budget-timetable>

Stage 1 Setting out objectives and identifying options.

Stage 2 Determining the best option and developing a framework for implementation including detailed policy design.

Stage 3 Drafting legislation to effect the proposed change.

Stage 4 Implementing and monitoring the change.

Stage 5 Reviewing and evaluating the change.

3. Where possible, the Government will:

- engage interested parties on changes to tax policy and legislation at each key stage of developing and implementing the policy;
- make clear at what stage (or stages) the engagement is taking place so that its scope is clear;
- carry out at least one formal, written, public consultation in areas of significant reform;
- set out, as the policy develops, its strategy for stakeholder engagement including planned formal consultation periods, informal discussions, working groups and workshops;
- consult, where it can, on the policy design, draft legislation and implementation of anti-avoidance and other revenue protection measures, provided this does not present additional risk to the Exchequer;
- minimise the occasions on which it consults only on a confidential basis. Where confidential consultation has been necessary the Government will be as transparent as possible about its outcome and consult openly if pursuing the policy change further; and
- provide feedback which sets out the Government's response to the views received and makes clear what changes, if any, have been made to the planned approach as a result of those views.

4. At each stage of consultation, the Government will set out clearly:

- the policy objectives and any relevant broader policy context;
- the scope of the consultation, in particular what is already decided and where there is still scope to influence the outcome;
- its current assessment of the impacts of the proposed change and seek to engage with interested parties on this analysis. A final assessment of impacts will be published once the final policy design has been confirmed...

5. Informal consultation will be as transparent as possible, consistent with the need to protect revenue. The best principles of formal consultation will be applied to informal consultation to ensure clarity of scope, impact, accessibility, and meaningful feedback. ... Informal consultation can run alongside formal consultation but will often be most appropriate at the earliest and latest stages of tax policy development to

identify options and then to fine-tune the detailed legislation and implementation of change.

### **Exceptions**

8. The Government will generally not consult on straightforward rates, allowances and threshold changes, or other minor measures; recognising, however, that even in these cases some level of consultation can often be informative. It may also adopt a different approach for revenue protection or anti-avoidance measures where following this Framework could present a risk to the Exchequer. In other circumstances where the Government decides not to consult during tax policy development it will explain the reasons for that decision.

9. There will be times when it will be necessary to deviate from this Framework. In these circumstances the Government will be as open as possible about the reasons for such deviations.<sup>90</sup>

Of course tax is not unique in this respect: similar considerations apply to all areas of law reform. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was enacted in two working days; and in holding it to be unlawful, the Divisional Court noted in moderate terms:

legislation enacted in haste is more prone to error.<sup>91</sup>

### 1.11.2 *Compliance with Framework*

How far has tax reform since 2011 has complied with the Framework? That is a broad question; it would need a volume to itself, there has been so much.

In brief, compliance with the Framework's tax reform timetable has been patchy. It is easier to announce good intentions than to abide by them. The culture of "ready, fire, aim" still prevails.

A few examples will illustrate the point.

The ATED regime was introduced in breach of the Framework. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee commented:

... the Government's response to SDLT avoidance might have been more appropriately designed had it consulted interested parties at the outset as its 'new approach to tax policy making' stipulates. We recommend that

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<sup>90</sup> [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/89261/tax-consultation-framework.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89261/tax-consultation-framework.pdf)

<sup>91</sup> *R oao Davis v Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin) at [121].

the Government adhere to that approach in designing future tax changes.<sup>92</sup>

The 2013 disallowances of debts for IHT were introduced in breach of the Framework. But neither here, nor, as far as I am not aware, in any other case have the Government acknowledged a breach of the Framework or been “as open as possible about the reasons for such deviations.”

The 2016 dividend income reforms, a major change (also misdescribed as simplification<sup>93</sup>), were introduced in breach of the Framework. The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee comment:

We deeply regret the lack of consultation on the savings [Personal Savings Allowance] and dividend income proposals and repeat the recommendation in our Report on the draft Finance Bill 2014 that the Government should reassert its commitment to the ‘new approach’ to tax policy making and make sure that, in future, it adheres to it in full except in the most exceptional circumstances.<sup>94</sup>

The Law Society say:

... the new approach is (i) not always followed, and (ii) side-stepped by labelling new tax law as anti-avoidance when it is no such thing.

A case in point is the FA 2014, which introduced changes to the way in which certain members of limited liability partnerships were taxed. When this proposal was first published, it was an anti-avoidance measure. Following initial consultation, the nature of the proposal changed markedly and became more widely applicable to professional partnerships. This was not anti-avoidance legislation but, nevertheless, there was no formal consultation of the kind envisaged by Tax Consultation Framework.<sup>95</sup>

The Tax Professionals Forum note some cases where the framework was followed, and then say:

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92 House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs *The Draft Finance Bill 2013* (March 2013) para 210

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeconaf/139/139.pdf>

93 Summer Budget 2015, para 1.186: “the government will reform and simplify the system of dividend taxation...”

94 “The Draft Finance Bill 2016” (2016), para 250

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeconaf/108/108.pdf>

95 The House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee was also highly critical: see the Committee report “The Draft Finance Bill 2014” (2014).

In contrast, however, in other cases, consultations have started:

- part way through the process (such as that on the provisions relating to the transfer of assets abroad and gains made by offshore close companies),
- without a clear articulation of the policy involved (for example, on IR35 and Controlling Persons), or
- without any discussion of the policy (for example, the changes to SDLT on properties owned by non-residents through companies, investment funds and others and the cap on income tax reliefs).<sup>96</sup>

The 2017 reforms were announced in 2015, which should have allowed time for thinking and consultation. Two years is an appropriate time scale to introduce major reforms, and at the time it seemed a refreshing break from the pattern of 2008 to see reform enacted on that basis. But two caveats to this welcome development:

- (1) A distant deadline allowed the more difficult and serious work to be put off, the matter was concluded in the usual mad rush, and the end result is disappointing. Still, deferring the some aspects of the offshore tax reforms to 2018, to allow consideration, is encouraging.
- (2) The need for time was not accepted by Labour:

... why else would the Government have given a grace period for those non-doms affected to get an offshore trust if they do not have one already? ... why else would the Government have actively signposted the changes for non-doms, which has set hares running? It seems to me that those are things that the architect of the measures would do if they were of a mind to completely undermine the measures' effectiveness.<sup>97</sup>

On the other hand, the IHT residence nil-rate band, 10 dense pages of legislation, was slotted into the F(no.2)A 2015, thus precluding proper debate and consideration, even though the rules only took effect from 2017/18! and even though there had to be a second installment of the legislation in the FA 2016.

The last part of the Tax Consultation Framework requires post-implementation monitoring and evaluation. This has almost never been done. It is interesting to speculate what would happen if it had.

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<sup>96</sup> Tax Professionals Forum Second Independent Annual Report (2013).

<sup>97</sup> Peter Dowd (Labour Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury) Hansard, 19 Oct 2017 [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-10-19/debates/f87da5ea-33a7-4a01-b497-1f3aaa15830e/FinanceBill\(FourthSitting\)](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-10-19/debates/f87da5ea-33a7-4a01-b497-1f3aaa15830e/FinanceBill(FourthSitting))

### 1.11.3 *Alternatives to Framework*

There is one route and one route only to a good tax system: sound tax policy devised by those with a sound understanding of the current tax system; a leisurely timetable of consultation and legislative drafting as envisaged in the Tax Consultation Framework and the 10 tax tenets of ICAEW.<sup>98</sup> That is a hard prescription, though CIOT and others continue to bang away at the drum.<sup>99</sup>

It is tempting to look for easier solutions. Past attempts include the tax law rewrite, which achieved little; and, perhaps,<sup>100</sup> the HMRC charter which achieved nothing.

The most recent is the GAAR; it will take several decades to assess whether that will yield a consistent case law and reasonable predictability of outcome. Advocates of the GAAR claimed:

Enacting an anti-abuse rule should make it possible, by eliminating the need for a battery of specific anti-avoidance sub-rules, to draft future tax rules more simply and clearly. Also, fewer schemes would be enacted and so there will be less call for specific remedial legislation...In time, once confidence is established in the effectiveness of the anti-abuse rule, it should be possible to initiate a programme to reduce and simplify the existing body of detailed anti-avoidance rules.<sup>101</sup>

I am not sure if anyone seriously believed that, but it has not come about, or at least, there is no sign of it yet.

## 1.12 The future

The 2017 reforms may put to an end the lobbying on the domicile issue from the left (also to some extent from beyond that). But that seems unlikely.

In the 2016/17 edition of this work I cited the assessment of Martin Wolf

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98 <http://www.icaew.com/~media/Files/Technical/Tax/Tax%20news/TaxGuides/TAXGUIDE-02-00-Better-Tax-System.pdf>

99 See Institute for Government, “Better Budgets: Making tax policy better” (Jan 2017) <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/better-budgets-making-tax-policy-better>

100 But the HMRC charter should probably be regarded a matter of spin and presentation, and not as a serious attempt to address any tax issues.

101 Aaronson, *GAAR Study* (2011) para 1.7 [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130321041222/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar\\_final\\_report\\_111111.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130321041222/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf)



(chief economics commentator at the Financial Times):

The chancellor has little interest in making the tax system less complex and more coherent.<sup>102</sup>

That still seems to be the case, and my earlier conclusion seems justified by events:

The complexity and incoherence of the UK tax system will continue to increase for as long as the HMRC view prevails, that simplicity and coherence, while perhaps desirable, have low or nil priority in the context of tax reform;<sup>103</sup> and that the current state of tax and tax reform is good, or if it is not good, nothing can be done to make it better.

Perhaps the safest prediction is continued publication of new reports condemning the existing state of legislation and seeking improvement. For the most recent, see “House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, “The Legislative Process: Preparing Legislation for Parliament””.<sup>104</sup>

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102 Financial Times 9 July 2015.

103 Thus the OTS has no role in the development of new tax law.

104 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldconst/27/27.pdf> (2017)



## CHAPTER TWO

# TAX AVOIDANCE

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### 2.1 Tax avoidance: Introduction

Tax avoidance is as old as taxation itself;<sup>1</sup> but the topic has taken prominence over the last few years, with extensive attention from parliament and the media.<sup>2</sup>

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1 For examples from 1798 and 1920, see “Tax Avoidance in 1798” <http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Tax-avoidance-criticism-in-1798.pdf> and “Vestey: Royal Commission debate” [http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Vestey\\_Royal\\_Commission\\_debate.pdf](http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Vestey_Royal_Commission_debate.pdf).

2 It is interesting to speculate why that has been the case. I think the reasons lie more in the realm of politics and sociology than tax law and practice. The Public Accounts

The subject impinges on many aspects of this book, but it is best to consider it as a topic and in a chapter of its own.

I begin with the splendid admonition of David Cameron:

Of course there is a difference between tax evasion and tax avoidance. Evasion is illegal. It can and should be subject to the full force of the criminal law.

But what about tax avoidance? Now of course there's nothing wrong with sensible tax planning and there are some things that governments want people to do that reduce tax bills, such as investing in a pension, a start up business or giving money to a charity. But there are some forms of avoidance that have become so aggressive that I think it is right to say these raise ethical issues, and it is time to call for more responsibility and for governments to act accordingly.

In the UK we've already committed hundreds of millions (?) into this effort, but acting alone has its limits. Clamp down in one country and the travelling caravan of lawyers, accountants and financial gurus will just move on elsewhere. ...

I believe in low taxes, that is why my government is cutting the top rate of income tax, we've cut corporation tax. [*Delete - political*].<sup>3</sup>

Individuals and businesses must pay their fair share. And businesses who think they can carry on dodging that fair share, or that they can keep on selling to the UK and setting up ever more complex tax arrangements abroad to squeeze their tax bills right down, well they need to wake up and smell the coffee, because the public who buy from them have had enough.<sup>4</sup>

All the main tropes of the political debate are in this passage:

- (1) Everyone should pay a "fair share" of tax.
- (2) Some taxpayers fail to do so due to tax avoidance.
- (3) Tax avoidance is unethical, immoral or anti-social.
- (4) Acknowledgement of the avoidance/evasion distinction;<sup>5</sup> but it does not contradict point (3). In the words of Margaret Hodge: "We're not

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Committee, and some effective pressure groups, have clearly contributed but given the pressure on the front page, why has their work received so enthusiastic a reception? The 2008 financial crisis and climate of austerity may be a factor.

3 This side note is included in the version of the speech published online; one wonders what happened when the speech was delivered.

4 David Cameron speech to World Economic Forum in Davos, January 2013  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-minister-david-camersons-speech-to-the-world-economic-forum-in-davos>

5 I suspect newspaper libel readers (rightly) insert this if a journalist overlooks it.

accusing you of being illegal, we're accusing you of being immoral.”  
(5) Disparaging references to tax advisers.<sup>6</sup>

On the political left, the same points are made, but more stridently, and, of course, without Cameron's approval of low taxes.

## 2.2 Need for analysis

This chapter draws on a paper published by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, (“**the OUCBT paper**”).<sup>7</sup> The OUCBT paper says:

The question is how to tackle the problems. This requires a clear analysis of their cause and differentiation between different causes. Labelling a whole range of quite different behaviours as “avoidance” without further differentiation is unhelpful. ...

Differentiation requires terminology. As there is no agreed terminology,<sup>8</sup> it is best not to use any terms at all without some explanation of what is meant.

### 2.2.1 *Categorisation of avoidance*

If one is to identify the correct response to the problems of avoidance, one must distinguish:

- (1) **Ineffective avoidance** (no tax saving if the law is correctly applied)
- (2) **Effective avoidance** (tax saved by avoidance)
- (3) **Non-avoidance** (little tax paid but not due to avoidance)<sup>9</sup>

These are important distinctions because:

- (1) Ineffective avoidance may be countered by enforcement of the law.
- (2) Effective avoidance can only be countered by changes in tax law.
- (3) In cases of non-avoidance:
  - (a) It may be no change in tax law is appropriate.<sup>10</sup>

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6 This feeds on another very ancient trope concerning lawyers.

7 “Tax avoidance” (2012)

[http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business\\_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/TaxGap\\_3\\_12\\_12.pdf](http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/TaxGap_3_12_12.pdf) (I omit some footnotes here).

8 For instance, Tiley described “tax planning” as a euphemism for avoidance, which is no doubt sometimes (maybe often) the case.

9 The OUCBT paper adopts the somewhat unhelpful labels “categories A, B, and C”. It is difficult to find short labels which neatly sum up the concepts: “Ineffective avoidance” is not ideal as this is not really “avoidance” at all.

10 It may be that a change in public expectation or knowledge is desirable.

- (b) If change is needed, the change is one of policy as well as of tax law; and the matter should be considered without the haste and moral outrage that effective avoidance tends to cause.

If one wishes to assess emotional and moral responses to avoidance, and actual or theoretical anti-avoidance rules, we need further vocabulary to discuss the range of tax-motivated behaviour.

We might cover the terrain in four categories:<sup>11</sup>

**Uncontroversial tax planning** Taking advantage of a tax relief in a manner *everyone* would accept as reasonable and indeed desirable. As this is at the bottom of the spectrum, it is easy to find clear examples: for instance, pension contributions, and moderate<sup>12</sup> charity giving.<sup>13</sup> This is so even if, as is often the case, care is needed in order to use or to maximise the relief, for instance, fixing contributions each year to below the cap for the relief, or fixing benefits within the permitted limits for gift aid.

**Ordinary tax planning** Using tax legislation in a way which some politicians and commentators do not like, but where the planning is ordinary in the sense that many people have done and continue to do it; it is obvious and foreseeable; the points probably came to the mind of those responsible for the legislation, or should have done, or there is no reason to think that parliament would have done anything different if it had considered the points. Ordinary tax planning is not contrary to the “intention of parliament” as that construct is normally understood.

Examples are:

- (1) Advancing or delaying
  - (a) disposals for CGT purposes or

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11 There are many ways to slice this cake. Lord Walker proposed seven types of tax avoidance (a riff on Empson’s *Seven Types of Ambiguity*): “Ramsay 25 years on” [2004] LQR 120. Contrast Barnett, “A baker’s dozen” *Taxation Magazine*, 2 August 2012. But one must resist the temptation to taxonomy for its own sake. All classification is (or should be) purposive: a useful taxonomy must draw *useful* distinctions: it should identify categories which call for different responses, and only those.

12 In the debate on the Budget 2012, some said that giving more than £50k or 25% of income was excessive.

13 These are the examples which Cameron called “sensible tax planning” in the quote at the start of this chapter.

- (b) payment of income (eg by dividends or bonus)
- (c) pension contributions for IT purposes  
in anticipation of changes of rates or going non-resident
- (2) Transfer of family assets or business to a spouse to equalise income
- (3) Transfer to a company to reduce tax rates
- (4) Lifetime giving to avoid IHT
- (5) Going non-resident

The term “tax mitigation” could be used to cover uncontroversial tax planning and ordinary tax planning.

**Tax avoidance** Something legal but contrary to the intention of parliament in the sense that had parliament thought about it, it would probably prevent the tax advantage. An example is the transfer of assets to a non-resident company where the transferor has power to enjoy.

Other possible examples are:

- (1) The scheme in *Furniss v Dawson*
- (2) Temporary non-residence (if tax-driven)

However one might place these at the upper reaches of the ordinary tax planning spectrum

**Tax abuse** Tax avoidance with aggravating features (typically, self-cancelling steps) that make it (more) unreasonable.<sup>14</sup> As this is at the top of the spectrum, it is easy to find clear examples: take the schemes in: *Ramsay, Fitzwilliam, Astall, Mayes, UBS*.

Thus this terminology raises three distinctions:

- (1) Uncontroversial/ordinary tax planning
- (2) Tax planning/avoidance
- (3) Tax avoidance/abuse

Before considering whether these distinctions have, or should have, different consequences, it is important to note three difficulties which they entail:

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14 The epithet commonly used is “egregious” or “aggressive”. That does not clarify anything but it neatly expresses the point.

For completeness: In technical EU-law terminology the term “abuse” is used in a different sense; see 69.15.2 (Abuse, avoidance, evasion: Terminology); similarly in OECD discussion; see 67.5 (OECD concept of abuse). However we are not concerned with that usage here.

- (1) *Demarcation problems* Except at the extreme ends of the spectrum, the demarcation problem is intractable: the classification of specific examples (if it actually had to be decided) would give rise to endless disagreement (and has done so in the context of tax motive defences). There are two reasons for this:
  - (a) The distinctions rely on:
    - (i) imponderable hypothetical questions (what would parliament have done if it had noticed the issue?)
    - (ii) vague constructs (“the intention of parliament” and “the spirit of the legislation”)
    - (iii) identifying tax policy (there may be no clear policy, or it may fluctuate)
  - (b) The four distinct categories attempt to impose an order on tax motivated behaviour which exhibits a scale of unreasonableness, without distinct divisions. It might be better to mark out a sliding scale from 1 to 10, recognising finer distinctions, but that would not help for practical purposes. It is often the case that experience is a continuum on which the law seeks to impose bipolar categories, but the difficulty in doing so here is greater than usual because the distinction is more imponderable.
- (2) *Tax-law knowledge problems* Except for the extreme ends of the spectrum, (a small part of the field) a serious discussion of where any particular arrangement should be classified, or graded, can only be carried out by someone who understands the tax background. Few non-practitioners have much understanding. Journalists in the UK do not arrange for their work to be reviewed by someone who understands tax. Politicians are characterised by grandstanding and soundbites. Pressure groups grind their axes. The details, important to those within the profession, are likely to bore or bewilder most people outside it.
- (3) *Factual knowledge problems* If discussing particular instances, one needs to know the facts, which are not usually in the public domain.

### 2.2.2 *Significance and recognition of distinctions*

The distinctions I have drawn are not easy, but they are the best that can be achieved.

The ordinary tax planning/tax avoidance dividing line is established in tax law. It marks the point where:



- (1) Tax motive provisions begin to bite<sup>15</sup>
- (2) Extra-statutory concessions cease to apply
- (3) HMRC Manuals cease to bind HMRC<sup>16</sup>

A tax avoidance/tax abuse distinction was not drawn in tax law until 2013, but it marks the point at which the GAAR<sup>17</sup> is intended<sup>18</sup> to bite:

The Government agrees with the Report's recommendation to introduce a rule which is targeted at artificial and abusive arrangements (those that the Report refers to as "egregious", "very aggressive" or "highly abusive contrived and artificial"). It accepts the Report's conclusion that introducing a "broad spectrum" general anti-avoidance rule would not be beneficial for the UK tax system. ... the GAAR should not affect what the Report describes as "the centre ground of tax planning".<sup>19</sup>

There has not been much judicial discussion (the issue has not arisen for decision) but a passage in *Furniss v Dawson* recognises something like a tax avoidance/abuse distinction:

The scheme [in *Furniss*] has none of the extravagances of certain tax avoidance schemes which have recently engaged the attention of the courts, where the taxpayer who has been fortunate enough to realise a capital profit has gone out into the street and, with the aid of astute advisers, manufactured out of a string of artificial transactions a supposed loss in order to counteract the profit which he has already

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15 See 38.7 (Avoidance, mitigation, tax reduction, evasion).

16 HMRC Guidance Manuals introduction: "Subject to [limited specified] qualifications readers may assume the [HMRC Manual] guidance applies in the normal case; but where HMRC considers that there is, or may have been, avoidance of tax the guidance will not necessarily apply."  
<http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/advisory.htm>

17 In this book references to "the GAAR" are to the general anti-*abuse* rule in FA 2013. For completeness, there are (at least) two other (rather specialist) GAARs (where the abbreviation stands for general anti-*avoidance* rule): Part 5 Revenue Scotland and Tax Powers Act 2014; Part 3A Tax Collection and Management (Wales) Act 2016.

18 The statutory definition (perhaps unavoidably) allows some scope for mission creep. Section 207(2) FA 2013 provides for the purposes of the GAAR: "Tax arrangements are "abusive" if they ... cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of action...". The extent to which the GAAR will successfully focus on this target remains to be seen. But it is significant that the GAAR is called a general anti-*abuse* rule, not a general anti-*avoidance* rule.

19 HMRC consultation document "A General Anti-Abuse Rule" (2012) para 2.1.

made. The scheme before your Lordships is a simple and honest scheme which merely seeks to defer payment of tax until the taxpayer has received into his hands the gain which he has made.<sup>20</sup>

The uncontroversial/ordinary tax planning distinction is not relevant in tax law, but it is relevant to the public debate on morality.

## 2.3 Tax avoidance and morality

### 2.3.1 *Morality and taxation*

This is intended to be a practical work. The relationship between morality and law (or tax-morality and tax law) is another book. But attitudes to the (im)morality of tax avoidance do have practical consequences for tax: it affects judicial attitudes and decisions; it was a driver for the enactment of the GAAR and will play an important role in its interpretation.

The topic of the relationship between morality and taxation should be seen as part of a wider discussion of the relationship between morality and law. Without entering into these deep waters, it should generally be accepted that not everything which is immoral should be proscribed by law.

### 2.3.2 *Judicial view in the past*

Older cases do uniformly regard tax avoidance as morally neutral. In 1900:

Bundey J. recognises to the full both the legal *and the moral* right of every man to dispose of his property if he can in a way which does not expose it to be taxed under the existing system of taxation.<sup>21</sup>

In 1965:

The fact that a settlement is drawn with a view to avoiding particular charging provisions is *neither reprehensible, nor* a proper ground for inclination to a conclusion that it ought to come within those or some other charging provisions. ... If any moral criticism could be levelled at them, then the consciences of the judges of the Chancery Division, in the exercise of their discretionary jurisdiction under the Variation of Trusts Act 1958, would be in a sorry state.<sup>22</sup>

Lord Diplock expressed the traditional view in 1964:

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20 [1984] AC 474 at p.518.

21 *Simms v Registrar of Probates* [1900] AC 323 at p.333.

22 *Re Kirkwood* [1965] Ch 286 at p.327.

Tax law no more lies within the field of morals than does a crossword puzzle.<sup>23</sup>

Likewise in 1982:

the fact that the purpose of the scheme was tax avoidance does not carry any implication that it was in any way reprehensible or other than perfectly honest *and respectable*.<sup>24</sup>

Without attempting a full survey, it appears that similar views were held throughout the common law world. In America in 1947:

Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.<sup>25</sup>

In Australia in 1995:

The obligation to pay [income tax] is a legal one. Some politicians try to treat it as a moral obligation. But it is not. The citizen is bound to pay no more tax than the statute requires him to pay according to the relevant state of his affairs.

Consistently with this view, it has long been a principle of the law of income taxation that the citizen may so arrange his affairs as to render him less liable to pay tax than would be the case if his affairs were cast in some different form. In the language of the layman, the citizen is entitled to minimise his liability to pay tax. This is sometimes expressed as a right to avoid tax...<sup>26</sup>

### 2.3.3 *Pro-avoidance rationale*

The following points can be made in favour of the traditional view, that tax avoidance is morally neutral:

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23 Diplock, "The Courts as Legislators" Address to The Holdsworth Club (1965) <http://www.kessler.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/CourtsAsLegislators.pdf>.

24 *IRC v Burmah Oil* 54 TC 200 at p.220; followed in 1988 in *Craven v White* 62 TC 1 at p.196.

25 *Commissioner v Newman*, 159 F2d 848 (1947). The case concerned the taxation of settlor-interested trusts.

26 Sir Garfield Barwick (Chief Justice of Australia 1964–81), *A Radical Tory* (1995) at p.229.

(1) *Difficulties of “right amount of tax”*

The tax system is full of anomalies, artificial, arbitrary, and not based on any consistent principles. One might say there is generally no “right” amount of tax except in the sense of what is due by statute.

(2) *Difficulty of applying moral principles*

This is perhaps another way of putting point (1): The view that taxation is governed by moral principles distinct from the rules of black letter tax law either:

- (a) requires one to enter into the intractable distinction of tax avoidance/abuse; or
- (b) spreads the net very wide, far wider than any practitioner is likely to accept (and still requires one to enter into the intractable distinction of uncontroversial/ordinary tax planning).

In practice, public debate does not engage with black letter tax law and it is difficult to envisage that it ever would, or could. Ethics is a practical subject. It only works if the entities called “right” and “wrong” are reasonably distinguishable and of a more or less permanent nature. If standards are so vague, or so difficult to apply in actual cases, that we cannot see how we could act on them, we become sceptical. That suggests that morality has little if any role to play.

(3) *The problem of egregious over-taxation*

I coin the expression “**egregious over-taxation**” to refer to situations where HMRC take advantage of anomalies in their favour in a manner which is unfair and contrary to the intention of Parliament (as that expression is understood in a tax avoidance context). It is the opposite of tax avoidance. Three distinct sub-issues arise here:

- (a) Does egregious over-taxation arise in practice
- (b) Is it proper for HMRC to seek egregious over-taxation
- (c) What light does that shed on the issue of tax avoidance morality

Issue (a) is a question of fact, to which the short answer is, yes. Of course the Courts generally try to construe statutes to prevent egregious over-taxation, just as they try to prevent avoidance; but sometimes they do not achieve this. For instance, the unfortunate Mr Lobler fell into the trap of a partial surrender of life policies:

He made no profit or gain as that term is commonly or commercially understood and yet he becomes liable to pay tax which exhausts his life

savings and may bankrupt him. That is an outrageously unfair result.... This is legislation which does not seek to tax real or commercial gains. Thus it makes no sense to say that the legislation must be construed to apply to transactions by reference to their commercial substance....No overriding principle can be extracted from the legislation.... Thus with heavy hearts we dismiss the appeal.<sup>27</sup>

There are then four possible moral approaches:

<b>View</b>	<b>Tax avoidance</b>	<b>Egregious over-taxation</b>
1	Wrong	Right
2	Right	Wrong
3	Wrong	Wrong
4	Right	Right

One might perhaps adopt view 1, that tax avoidance is wrong but egregious over-taxation is right, in short, fairness should apply in favour of HMRC but not the taxpayer; but no-one has had the temerity to advocate that.

One might perhaps adopt view 2, that tax avoidance is right, but HMRC should be bound by a further requirement of fairness; but few if any advocate that either.

So if sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, we are limited to views 3 or 4.

View 3 is possible, but it is not supported by HMRC. Those who support the view that tax should be governed by rules rather than discretion also cannot logically criticise HMRC for seeking egregious over-taxation, where the law requires, though can criticise them for not seeking to change the law promptly after unfairness has been identified (and, if appropriate, publish an ESC to operate in the meantime).

So we fall back on view 4, thus this consideration supports the view that there is nothing wrong in avoidance.<sup>28</sup>

One would wish that HMRC were as concerned about egregious over-taxation as they are about its flipside, avoidance, (egregious or otherwise).

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<sup>27</sup> *Lobler v HMRC* [2013] UKFTT 141 (TC). In order to avoid the unfairness the Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal, though it had to rewrite the law of rectification as previously understood in order to do so; see [2015] UKUT 152 (TCC). The law was later amended; See 39.3.5 (Partial surrender trap). But that does not affect the point being made here.

<sup>28</sup> For an example of this line of reasoning in use, see the *Ayrshire Pullman* quote below.

Of course, egregious over-taxation is different in that it brings in revenue rather than losing it; however, in addition to the unfairness for its victims, it has an intangible cost in that it brings the UK tax system into disrepute. But there it is.

(4) *Tax avoidance sometimes leads to fair results*

This relates to point (3): There are cases where tax avoidance avoids egregious over-taxation. An example is the use of multiple policies to avoid the tax trap of partial surrender.<sup>29</sup>

Parliament sometimes admits this, by enacting a new relief to allow directly what had previously been achieved by avoidance. Examples are:

- (a) Nil rate band discretionary trusts, which allowed transferable nil rate bands before the IHT relief was enacted in 2007.
- (b) CGT group relief to obtain loss relief. A company about to realise a gain on an asset would formerly transfer it to a group company that had realised an allowable loss. Alternatively, a company which had realised a gain might acquire from a group company an asset which was to be sold at a loss. That would allow the loss to be set against the gain before the introduction of the election to allocate gains and losses around a group, in 2009.<sup>30</sup>

Offshore trusts mitigate the economically deleterious lock-in effect of CGT by deferring tax until gains are received.

Tax avoidance (if it be such) sometimes permits a business to continue which would otherwise be destroyed by taxation.<sup>31</sup>

Related to this is the use of tax avoidance for political/economic ends. High tax rates may be mitigated by avoidance, achieving a pragmatic compromise between incompatible political viewpoints, or allowing a public perception which is different from the reality. IFS say:<sup>32</sup>

... in principle, it would be efficient to tax relatively mobile activities at a lower rate in order to avoid deterring mobile activities while allowing a higher rate to be supported on less mobile activities.<sup>33</sup> Avoidance behaviours are one way that de facto lower rates on more mobile income

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29 See 39.3.5 (Partial surrender trap).

30 Section 171A TCGA.

31 For an example, see *Fisher v HMRC* [2014] UKFTT 805 (TC).

32 IFS, *Green Budget 2013* p.290 <http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2013/gb2013.pdf>

33 Footnote original: See Mirrlees et al., *Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review* (2011) <http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesReview/design> at p.12.

are achieved. ... In this case, there may even be benefits to the UK from avoidance opportunities if the lower tax rates achieved on mobile activities – for example, through profit shifting – mean that more real activity is in the UK than would otherwise be the case.<sup>34</sup>

This fudge has its costs, including the inefficiencies that arise from tax planning, fiscal instability and public cynicism; but it happens.

#### 2.3.4 *Practitioner/judicial views today*

The above sets out a powerful intellectual case in favour of the view that avoidance, like Lord Diplock's crossword, is morally neutral. It was formerly generally accepted, and has never been refuted. But the argument has been found less convincing, or unconvincing, I think for two reasons:

- (1) The traditional view was formed in earlier times when there was tax avoidance but little (if any) activity in the category of tax abuse. When that changed, I think in the 1970's, the above argument came to be regarded as less convincing.
- (2) The argument requires an understanding of the tax system as it actually is. Politicians and other non-tax practitioners entered into the debate without that knowledge.

Whatever the reason, the argument has become perceived as less cogent. By 2007:

For many directors, the objection to arrangements that are in their view 'too' artificial may be framed largely in terms of business ethics. Other directors, equally determined to behave in an ethical way, may consider that the degree of artificiality is not an ethical issue provided no attempt is made to misrepresent the facts or to hide them from the tax authorities....

At one time such a view would perhaps have been more widely held than now. At the present time it represents one end of a range of views in a debate where probably most commentators would hold that within the compass of what is legal there is some behaviour that is acceptable and some that is not...<sup>35</sup>

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34 Footnote original: There is an academic literature on the costs and possible benefits of tax planning. See for example, D. Dharmapala, "What problems and opportunities are created by tax havens?", *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 2008, 24, 661–79.

35 David Williams "Developing the Concept of Tax Governance" (February 2007) <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gn5Xu4GPUIMJ:www.i>

In 2011, Aaronson's GAAR study reported the views of taxpayer representative bodies:

There was unanimous disapproval, indeed distaste, for egregious tax avoidance schemes.<sup>36</sup>

Of course tax practitioners do not all share the same view. But I think it is the case that they are mostly drawn to the view that opprobrium should only attach at the top end of the scale, in cases of tax abuse, in which case the GAAR has more or less rendered the issue academic; or if any opprobrium attaches to tax motivated behaviours lower down the scale, the amount of opprobrium should vary according to the scale.

This might be consistent with Lord Templeman's views in tax abuse cases, which were expressed trenchantly (some would say, stridently<sup>37</sup>):

In common with my predecessors I regard tax-avoidance schemes *of the kind invented and implemented in the present case* as no better than attempts to cheat the Revenue.<sup>38</sup>

This may be consistent with recent comments of the Supreme Court. In 2014:

Since the seminal decision of the House of Lords in *Ramsay v IRC*<sup>39</sup> there has been an increasingly strong and general recognition that *artificial* tax avoidance is a social evil which puts an unfair burden on the shoulders of those who do not adopt such measures.<sup>40</sup>

Evil is a strong word, even if constrained by "social"; though the scope of the comment depends on the word "artificial", which may mean little or much.<sup>41</sup>

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*brarian.net/navon/paper/Tax\_and\_Corporate\_Social\_Responsibility.pdf%3Fpaperid%3D8404118+&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk*

36 Aaronson, *GAAR Study* (2011)

[http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130321041222/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar\\_final\\_report\\_111111.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130321041222/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/gaar_final_report_111111.pdf).

37 Lord Neuberger referred more tactfully to Lord Templeman's "characteristically colourful language"; *R oao Evans v Attorney General* [2015] UKSC 21 at [53].

38 *IRC v Fitzwilliam* 67 TC 614 at p.756. Lord Templeman's claim that his attitude is held in common with his predecessors is untenable. But it is held in common with his successors.

39 54 TC 101.

40 *Futter v HMRC* 81 TC 912 Supreme Court at [135] (emphasis added).

41 *Nourse v Heritage Trustees* (15th January 2015) at [15] and [71] accessible [www.kessler.co.uk](http://www.kessler.co.uk).



And again in 2015, but perhaps more moderately expressed:

[Tax avoidance] gives rise to social costs which are significant and increasingly controversial.<sup>42</sup>

This comment, or its implication, has not been enthusiastically adopted. In *Altus Group v Baker Tilly* negligent accountants argued it was contrary to public policy to award damages for their failure to advise or implement an avoidance scheme. The argument was summarily rejected.<sup>43</sup> In a Guernsey case, an ill-advised gift to an EBT was set aside for mistake. The fact that the individual was participating in a scheme to avoid UK tax was not a reason for the Guernsey Court to refuse the relief.<sup>44</sup>

### 2.3.5 Impact of the GAAR

How has the GAAR altered the position? HMRC cite one of the best known dicta in taxation:

- [1] No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his stores.
- [2] The Inland Revenue is not slow - and quite rightly - to take every advantage which is open to it under the taxing Statutes for the purpose of depleting the taxpayer's pocket.
- [3] And the taxpayer is in like manner entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the depletion of his means by the Revenue.<sup>45</sup>

HMRC say that the GAAR has changed this:

[The above quote] epitomises the approach which Parliament has rejected in enacting the GAAR legislation. Taxation is not to be treated as a game<sup>46</sup> where taxpayers can indulge in any ingenious scheme in

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42 *Pendragon v HMRC* [2015] STC 1825 at [5].

43 [2015] STC 788 at [59](3) and [65].

44 See 38.17.2 ("Artificial" transactions/ devices).

45 *Ayrshire Pullman Motor Services v IRC* 14 TC 754 at p.763.

46 The game metaphor begs an essay to itself. What, in fact, is a game? It is an elastic concept which can be analogised in different ways. What is it in the notion of game which HMRC seek to identify as significantly different from tax? Is it a notion of non-seriousness? Or an adversarial approach? Or a notion of a rule-based activity? Or arbitrary rules? In the latter three respects, tax law and general law very much

order to eliminate or reduce their tax liability.<sup>47</sup>

At the abuse end of the spectrum, the GAAR now applies, so the rules have indeed changed. This impinges on the avoidance-morality debate insofar as the debate only concerns successful avoidance, ie avoidance not caught by the GAAR. But nothing else has changed. *Ayrshire* itself was *not* an abuse case (the issue was whether the taxpayer's children had entered into a valid partnership) and the result would not have been affected by the GAAR. It also continues to be the case that HMRC enforce egregious over-taxation when the rules work in their favour.

### 2.3.6 *Views of regulators*

The SRA jumped on the bandwagon, issuing a warning entitled "Tax avoidance - your duties":

In the House of Lords case of *Ayrshire Pullman v CIR*, Lord Clyde said that "No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so as to arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his stores." That approach has been rejected by Parliament by bringing in the [GAAR].<sup>48</sup>

This is not correct.<sup>49</sup>

GAAR is clearly explained in HMRC guidance.

This is not correct. It seems unlikely that the author read and understood the guidance (admittedly not an easy task).

Similarly, the widespread assumption that "tax avoidance is legal" no longer applies.

This is not correct.<sup>50</sup>

While contemporary tax debate is characterised by misinformation and

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resemble games. These problems suggest that it would help clarity of thinking not to use the word "game": a stale and failed metaphor.

See Midgley, *Heart and Mind* (1981) chapter 8 (The game game).

47 HMRC, "GAAR Guidance" (2017)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-avoidance-general-anti-abuse-rules>

48 <https://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/code-of-conduct/guidance/warning-notice/Tax-avoidance---your-duties--Warning-notice.page> (September 2017).

49 See 2.3.5 (Impact of the GAAR).

50 Unless "avoidance" is intended to mean abuse within the scope of the GAAR.

shallow thinking,<sup>51</sup> perhaps inevitably so, it is dispiriting to see the same applies to the SRA.

The Charity Commission have made the same point.<sup>52</sup>

It seems likely that a circular went round from HMRC to regulators, with draft text, and the regulators complied without consultation or comment from tax practitioners.

### 2.3.7 *Professional codes of practice*

Accountants now parade their tax-morality. For instance, KPMG's Global Tax Principles provide:

We shall only advise clients to enter into, or assist them to implement, transactions or arrangements on the basis that they have any substance required by law, as well as any business, commercial or other non-tax purpose required by law.

We shall not advise clients to enter into transactions with the purpose of securing a tax advantage clearly and unambiguously contrary to the relevant legislation and shall not assist them to implement such transactions. If, in our view, the language of the legislation is uncertain, we shall consider the intention of the relevant legislators when advising clients.<sup>53</sup>

Who would advise clients to enter into transactions which lack the "substance required by law"? Or transactions contrary to the relevant legislation (never mind the GAAR)? A reader well-informed about taxation may be tempted to say, with Scrooge: Bah, humbug. But there are not many such readers, and perhaps KPMG's Tax Principles are not designed for them.

This raises a further set of issues arises in relation to practitioners who act in tax avoidance cases. There are conflicting normative visions of the lawyer's role, raising the basic question: can a good lawyer be a good person? For legal practitioners, client autonomy is a fundamental value.

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51 See App 12.1 (Nature of parliamentary debate).

52 "Charity tax reliefs: guidance on Charity Commission policy" (2015): "The GAAR makes it clear (!) that taxation is not to be treated as a game where taxpayers can indulge in any contrived or inventive scheme in order to eliminate or reduce their tax liability."

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/charity-tax-reliefs-guidance-on-charity-commission-policy/charity-tax-reliefs-guidance-on-charity-commission-policy>.

53 <https://home.kpmg.com/jp/en/home/about/tax/principles.html> (undated but accessed Nov 2017)

That view is not usually accepted, or understood, by the general public or by HMRC.<sup>54</sup> A whole book would be needed to discuss the topic.<sup>55</sup>

### 2.3.8 *Views of non-tax practitioners*

Outside the tax profession, the concept of what is unacceptable/immoral is not restricted to tax abuse, but extends to the ordinary tax planning level. That is, some very ordinary tax planning has come under fire. Practitioners might dismiss the views of those who know nothing about tax as unworthy of consideration. I give four examples from those whose views carry some weight.

*Deferring bonus in order to take advantage of announced reduction in tax rates:* This arose in 2013/14 when top rates fell from 50% to 45%. Practitioner-readers are likely to agree that this is ordinary tax planning near the bottom end of the scale. But Mervyn King, then Governor of the Bank of England, is reported to have criticised Goldman Sachs for it.<sup>56</sup> The House of Lords select committee noted that the GAAR will not apply to the deferral of bonuses from one tax year to another,<sup>57</sup> but one might infer that they disapproved none the less for that.

*The Bump Plan* In 2013 a minor political furore arose after David Heaton was secretly filmed, suggesting bonus payments to pregnant employees; if made during the relevant period this would increase the

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54 In 2015 HMRC called on the professional bodies “to take on a greater lead and responsibility in setting and enforcing clear professional standards around the facilitation and promotion of avoidance to protect the reputation of the tax and accountancy profession and to act for the greater public good.” See “Tackling tax evasion and avoidance” (the juxtaposition is significant) (2015) para 3.19.

[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/413931/Tax\\_evasion\\_FINAL\\_with\\_covers\\_and\\_right\\_sig.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413931/Tax_evasion_FINAL_with_covers_and_right_sig.pdf) But the subsequent Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation does not go very far in that direction.

55 For an introduction, see Windsor, “The Ethics of Government Legal Advisers” in Feldman (ed) *Law in Politics, Politics in Law* (2015).

56 Financial Times, 15 Jan 2013. King is co-author of the excellent (but now sadly out of date) *British Tax System* (5<sup>th</sup> ed, 1990).

57 Select Committee on Economic Affairs Report on The Draft Finance Bill 2013 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeconaf/139/139.pdf> The Select Committee said this was because that “the issue is one concerning the structure of the tax system rather than avoidance involving manipulation of loopholes in the legislation.” More analytically, the reason is that these are not examples of tax abuse (in my sense, which I take to be the same as the definition of “abusive” in the GAAR).

The GAAR guidance makes this point; see 56.4.7 (Postpone disposal: GAAR).

amount of statutory maternity pay.<sup>58</sup> I do not think practitioners would regard that as on the abusive side of the line (though there are many points which need to be made to properly understand the legal and moral analysis, none of which were heard in the public debate).<sup>59</sup> The point was not just political hot air: Heaton had to leave the GAAR panel following criticism from David Gauke (Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury).

*Income sharing by spouses* I think practitioners were surprised that HMRC found this unacceptable in their (ultimately unsuccessful) attack in *Jones v Garnett*. But exactly the same planning has been criticised in India:

While tax evasion is universally condemned, there is a disposition in certain quarters to regard tax avoidance as a permissible course of action. We are unable to endorse this view. The mere fact that the income-tax law is not violated does not mean that the procedure which results in tax avoidance is justified. We might take as an illustration the act of introducing, without adequate consideration, one's wife ... as partner in a business of which the assessee himself is a partner. It is an attempt to fraction income and reduce tax liability under a provision of law meant to apply to genuine partnerships. Conduct of this nature, though legal, cannot but be regarded as anti-social.<sup>60</sup>

*Gift of company to political party* A donor who owns a suitable company might arrange that:

- (1) The donor gives the company to the political party.
- (2) The political party extracts the funds by way of dividend.

The gift at stage (1) qualifies for CGT hold-over relief; and the distribution at stage (2) would not be taxable, assuming the party is a company for tax purposes.

It seems that Labour arranged this in 2013, giving rise to a fit of

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58 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9rFuhC2ZSEM>

59 In particular: (1) This planning does not give rise to a tax advantage, but to a benefit advantage for the employer; it could not be counteracted by the GAAR. (2) Not every payment to an employee is earnings so it is possible for planning of this kind to fail on the facts. (3) The privacy aspects of secret filming, and the ease with which short clips may misrepresent nuanced positions, seem particularly worrying. For the background, see Johnson, "Tax, Lies and Hypocrisy" (CCH Tax News, Issue 133 25 September 2013); for the law, see the Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations 1986.

60 Government of India Report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission 1953-54 Vol II para 5.

indignation, or purported indignation, from the Tories. An open letter from George Osborne to Ed Milliband provided:

... the Labour Party has gone to great lengths to help your biggest donor, ... avoid paying tax on a political donation. ...

The Labour Party registered a donation of shares in JML worth £1.65 million in January 2013, from Mr John Mills. By making a donation in shares rather than as a single cash dividend, it has been reported that Mr Mills managed to avoid a potential tax charge of £724,710.<sup>61</sup> ...

As leader of the Labour Party, and given your previous statements on tax avoidance, such actions by your party appear to be directly at odds with your public statements.

Most importantly, will you now pass the amount of tax that has been avoided to the Exchequer? As you say, this is money that is needed to fund vital public services such as the health service and our schools.<sup>62</sup>

What is one to make of this? I think any practitioner, or anyone who understood the tax background, would regard this as in the category of “sensible tax planning” or, perhaps, ordinary tax planning; in either case, well short of avoidance and opprobrium. The letter could be seen as just an example of debased political debate, meaningless playground insults whose object is just to knock the opposition. It could be taken as a case where ordinary tax planning is regarded as immoral. However, it may be regarded as an illustration of the difficulties which arise if one regards taxation as governed by moral principles distinct from black letter tax law. The letter might then be regarded as a rather subtle contribution to the political/moral debate. Perhaps there are elements of each of these.

### 2.3.9 *Context of discussion*

It is possible to discuss tax-morality in a lofty, disinterested and high-minded way. What is the good life? What would Aristotle say?

But in practice discussion is invested with flaming indignation, fuelled by hatred for those who support and connive with these injustices. This is fed by a sense of superiority that we are not like these instruments and accomplices of evil. The result is moral panic, contempt, hatred and

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61 This figure is wrong: it represents a tax rate of 44%. The effective rate of tax should have been 36.11% = £600k tax. Perhaps it is a typo. Perhaps it is irony. Perhaps no-one is intended to take the letter so seriously as to check the figures. If this is an indication of the tax advice given to Mr Osborne, it is rather worrying.

62 6 June 2013

aggression.<sup>63</sup> There is a great and easily mobilised hostility to anything that can be represented as avoidance. The remedies proposed become ever more penal and more discretionary.

The debate sometimes suffers from profound bad faith or hypocrisy. Politicians accuse others of tax-immorality in order to attack their opponents or promote themselves: see the letter to Ed Miliband above. Journalists do so to sell papers.

### 2.3.10 *Conclusion*

In short, there is widespread disagreement about the starting point, not to mention finish line, when it comes to the concept of avoidance or on issues of morality in connection with tax avoidance. This should not be a surprise, since the same applies to many contemporary moral issues, for instance, assisted suicide. There is no tribunal to adjudicate arguments on morality, except the court of public opinion, which, as Ibsen observed, is an extremely mutable thing.

## 2.4 **Tax gap**

Another common thread in public debate is a vast estimate of the amounts involved. HMRC publish figures called the “tax gap”, said to be £34 billion in 2015/16.<sup>64</sup> This is the total for innocent error, careless error, legal interpretation,<sup>65</sup> avoidance, evasion and criminal attacks on the tax system. Statistics are only as useful and reliable as the definitions on which they are based. The combination of these different categories makes the total figure meaningless. There is a danger that spurious statistics may gain currency and influence policy.<sup>66</sup>

Broken down, the figures are:

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63 This is a danger to which any discussion of morality is subject: see Taylor, *A Secular Age* (2007) chapter 18.

64 HMRC, “Measuring tax gaps 2017 edition, Tax gap estimates for 2015-16” (Oct 2017) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/measuring-tax-gaps>

65 In HMRC’s terminology, a tax loss arises from “legal interpretation” when the taxpayer disagrees with HMRC on an issue of tax law.

66 For a critique of the methodology, see Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation “The Tax Gap for Corporation Tax”, (2012) [http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business\\_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/TaxGap\\_3\\_12\\_12.pdf](http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/TaxGap_3_12_12.pdf).

The HMRC paper itself concedes that “There are many sources of potential error and uncertainty in these estimated tax gaps.”

£6.1bn	Failure to take reasonable care
£3.5bn	Hidden economy
£3.3bn	Innocent Error
£3.1bn	Non-payment
£6.0bn	Legal interpretation
£1.7bn	Avoidance

IFS say:

we don't know how much corporate tax is lost to the UK as a result of tax avoidance. This is partly because there is no accepted definition of exactly what constitutes 'avoidance' and partly because we lack full information about the activities of firms.<sup>67</sup>

Of course, the fact that an amount is unknown and unknowable does not mean that it is small or unimportant. I wonder if time spent guessing at figures is productive. It is however striking how small a part tax avoidance plays in the tax gap figures, compared to the attention it receives.

The IFS report continues:

Importantly, even if we knew that information and could calculate the tax lost to avoidance, it would not be right to assume that, were all avoidance opportunities to be completely removed, the UK would be able to collect that full amount. We would expect higher taxes to feed through, at least to some degree, to lower investment and changes in prices such that genuine UK profits may be lower. To the extent that the corporate tax affects prices or wages, or the location of firms' activities (and therefore jobs), there may also be lower receipts from income taxes or VAT.

This is true for all taxes, but particularly for corporation tax:

First, corporation tax is a particularly distortionary form of taxation that can work to reduce investment. This is especially the case for internationally mobile investments because firms will consider tax when choosing where to locate real activities...

Second, the ultimate incidence of corporate tax always lies with households and is borne either by the owners of capital (in the form of lower dividends), by workers (in the form of lower wages) or by consumers (in the form of higher prices). We do not know with any precision who is made worse off as the result of the corporation tax.

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67 IFS, *Green Budget 2013* p.297 <http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2013/gb2013.pdf>



However, estimates suggest that, because capital tends to be much more mobile than workers or consumers, a significant share of the burden of corporate tax tends to be shifted to domestic factors – and specifically labour. In other words, there is reason to believe that at least a part, and in some cases a large part, of the corporation tax that companies are subject to is ultimately passed on to workers in the form of lower wages.<sup>68</sup>

There is a certain irony in the second point, given the left’s enthusiasm for corporation tax; I think most economists do accept that the burden of corporation tax is borne by employees<sup>69</sup>, though not all.

## 2.5 The rule of law

### 2.5.1 What is “the rule of law”

There is a consensus on the rule of law. It is a “constitutional principle”.<sup>70</sup> It is one of four “fundamental British values”<sup>71</sup> and one of the six values on which the EU is founded.<sup>72</sup>

There is no consensus on the meaning of the phrase. It is an emotionally charged label for a set of principles, or sub-principles, the content of which is contested. This may not be a bad thing: the consensus on the rule of law is only possible because of dissensus as to its meaning. There is a certain irony in that the principle which forbids vague legislation is itself difficult to pin down. But the same is true of other cherished political

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68 IFS, *Green Budget 2013* p.290 <http://www.ifs.org.uk/budgets/gb2013/gb2013.pdf> (footnotes omitted).

69 ETPF Policy Paper 1 “Who bears the burden of corporate income taxation?” (May 2015) <http://www.etpf.org/papers/PP001CorpTax.pdf>

70 Section 1 Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

71 The other three are democracy, liberty and tolerance, according to the Government “Prevent Strategy”, Cm 8092 (2011), para 6.58 where opposition to these values is the definition of “extremism”. The point is repeated in the Government “Counter-Extremism Strategy” Cm 9148 (2015): “Extremism is the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.” [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf)  
[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/470088/51859\\_Cm9148\\_Accessible.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf)

72 Article 2 TEU provides: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights...”

virtues, such as democracy. A discussion needs a book to itself,<sup>73</sup> but as the term is used in different ways, it is best not to use it without some explanation of how it should be, or may be, understood. This section draws on the paper by Craig, “The Rule of Law” prepared for the Select Committee on Constitution.<sup>74</sup>

There is a consensus that the rule of law includes at least the following minimum requirements.<sup>75</sup>

Craig says:

*The Rule of Law and Lawful Authority*

A core idea of the rule of law to which all would subscribe is that the government must be able to point to some basis for its action that is regarded as valid by the relevant legal system. Thus in the UK such action would commonly have its foundation in statute, the prerogative or in common law power.

It follows that tax must be imposed by parliament through legislation.

Craig continues:

*The Rule of Law and Guiding Conduct*

A further important aspect of the rule of law is that the laws thus promulgated should be capable of guiding ones conduct in order that one can plan ones life.

It is from this general precept that Raz deduced a number of more specific attributes that laws should have in order that they could be said to comply with the rule of law. All are related to the idea of enabling individuals to be able to plan their lives. The 'list' includes the following

- (1) laws should be prospective, not retrospective;
- (2) they should be relatively stable;
- (3) particular laws should be guided by open, general and clear rules;<sup>76</sup>

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73 Raz, *The Authority of Law* (2nd ed., 2009), ch. 11 (“The Rule of Law and its Virtue”); Tamanaha, *On the Rule of Law* (1<sup>st</sup> ed, 2004); Pech, “The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the EU” (2009)

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1463242](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463242)

For the rule of law in a tax context, see Freedman & Vella, “HMRC’s Management of the UK Tax System: The Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion” Legal Research paper No 73/2012 (2012)

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2174946##](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2174946##)

74 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldconst/151/15115.htm>

75 This may be referred to as a thin, formal, procedural or narrow understanding of the rule of law.

76 The OUCBT paper spells out an implication of this: “The rule of law requires that taxpayers are able to determine the tax consequences of their actions in advance. This

- (4) there should be an independent judiciary;
- (5) there should be access to the courts;
- (6) the discretion which law enforcement agencies possess should not be allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules.

### 2.5.2 *Rule of law v. other values*

The rule of law is something to boast of,<sup>77</sup> and a feature which makes the UK an attractive place to reside, invest, or litigate. The Judicial Office boast:

The Rule of Law represents the cornerstone of liberty and democracy, and is one of the main reasons that the UK attracts global businesses and investors.

Laws in the UK are:

- public (so that everyone knows what they say)
- certain (so that everyone knows where they stand)
- prospective rather than retrospective (so that they cannot be broken before they exist)<sup>78</sup>

If only! Rule of law principles are challenged, or breached, in various aspects of taxation;<sup>79</sup> and the conflict with tax avoidance is particularly deep. Anti-avoidance is facilitated by techniques which breach the rule of law:

- (1) Administrative discretion
- (2) Vague legislation
- (3) Retrospective legislation

It is desirable to recognise that there is a trade-off between two policy aims, the rule of law and the combat of avoidance, rather than to fudge the matter by saying, or pretending, that these techniques are consistent with the rule of law. Then one can face the choice aware of the consequences of one choice or another. Craig says:

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can only be done through legislation and not vague notions of fairness.”

77 The boast is an old one. See Blackstone’s *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765) vol 2 chap 37: “a country like this, which boasts of being governed in all respects by law and not by will”; and contrast John Adams “A government of laws, and not of men” (1780).

78 “English Law, UK Courts and UK Legal Services after Brexit The View beyond 2019”

79 See for instance the problems raised by *Lobler* 2.3.2 (Judicial views).

... the rule of law in the above sense is only one virtue of a legal system, and may have to be sacrificed to attain other desired ends. We may feel that the rule of law virtues of having clear, general laws should be sacrificed if the best or only way to achieve a desired goal is to have more discretionary, open-textured legal provisions. This may be so where it is not possible to lay down in advance in the enabling legislation clear rules in sufficient detail to cover all eventualities. Modifications to the rule of law in this manner are not somehow forbidden or proscribed. Given that it is only one virtue of a legal system it should not prevent the attainment of other virtues valued by that system.

In 1974, Lord Simon placed the rule of law above the need to combat tax avoidance:

Disagreeable as it may seem that some taxpayers should escape what might appear to be their fair share of the general burden of national expenditure, it would be far more disagreeable to substitute the rule of caprice for that of law.<sup>80</sup>

The cure could be worse than the disease. In contemporary UK debate it is rare to find a statement in such strong terms. An exception comes from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, discussing this provision:

If—

- (a) a person enters into any arrangements; and
- (b) the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the person in entering into the arrangements is to avoid any obligation under these Regulations,

these Regulations are to have effect as if the arrangements had not been entered into.<sup>81</sup>

The Committee said:

... people who are satisfied that the terms of the regulations do not apply to them will be at constant risk of HMRC initially concluding that they have attempted to avoid the regulations and that the regulations therefore apply anyway – that being the default position in the absence of an appeal. It is unclear that such a result, which breaches the principle

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80 *Ransom v Higgs* 50 TC 1 at p.94. A similar spirit informed the decision in *Vestey v HMRC* in 1979; see 35.2 (Charge on transferor).

81 Reg 21 The Taxes (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2016.

of certainty, would be within the contemplation of enabling powers that do not contain express provision for the type of anti-avoidance provision used.

The fact that Parliament has, notably in Part 5 of the Finance Act 2013, [the GAAR] enacted anti-avoidance provisions which are similarly imprecise or discretionary is irrelevant to the security of such provisions in subordinate legislation, in the absence of express enabling powers. The Committee accordingly reports regulation 21 for a doubt as to whether it is *intra vires*.<sup>82</sup>

But this example also illustrates the weakness of the rule of law in the UK:

- (1) Regulation 21, whose validity is in doubt, remains in the legislation.<sup>83</sup>
- (2) Identical wording is found in:
  - (a) reg 23 International Tax Compliance Regulations 2015.<sup>84</sup>
  - (b) The residence-property TAAR.

Tax avoidance is an issue of international tax as well as domestic tax, and in the US, the rule of law is, perhaps, more highly valued.<sup>85</sup> Bob Stack (US Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs) criticised the OECD BEPS reforms, and UK diverted profits tax, for breaching the rule of law and international tax law principles:

Rather than producing administrable rules, the BEPS negotiators seemed to be opting instead for giving wide discretion to tax officials.<sup>86</sup> This brought into question the whole international tax system. Do the international tax rules even matter anymore?" Do we really need a standard setter to say, 'Tax administrators can use the pornography test to catch tax avoidance. We know it when we see it. And we will get you if we want to'?

[Diverted Profits Tax] ... took us further down the road in which a taxpayer is at the mercy of whatever a tax auditor decides is the right

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82 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmstatin/461-ix/46103.htm#inst01>

83 The Committee report was published after the provision came into force.

84 The argument that reg. 23 is ultra vires is weaker than for reg. 21, because unlike the position for the 2016 regulations, CRS authorises and requires "rules to prevent ... practices intended to circumvent the reporting and due diligence procedures". See section IX(A)(1). Perhaps the argument is still tenable. Perhaps reg 23 will be read purposefully and somewhat restrictively.

85 I would be interested to hear from US readers whether this generalisation is a valid one.

86 For an example, see 7.20 (Alternative tie-breaker: mutual agreement).

amount to pay. What made this particularly perturbing was that these measures emanated not from the usual suspects such as India, China, Brazil and South Africa, but from strong traditional residence countries [UK and Australia] that happened to be two of our closest friends.<sup>87</sup>

### 2.5.3 *Breach of rule of law: Consequences*

Craig says:

... the consequences of breach of the rule of law in the sense considered in this section. The fact that a law is vague or unclear, and that it therefore provides little by way of real guidance for those affected by it, will not lead to a statute being invalidated in the UK. The courts may well interpret such a statute narrowly, in favour of the individual in such circumstances. They might also read it down pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998, if the particular statute would otherwise infringe rights derived from the European Convention on Human Rights. If the courts felt unable to read it down, they could issue a declaration of incompatibility under the HRA, and the matter would be sent back to Parliament for reconsideration. The courts therefore have considerable interpretive techniques at their disposal to ensure that legislation that fails to meet the requirements of the rule of law set out above is construed narrowly in favour of the individual. This does not alter the fact that UK courts have not traditionally exerted power to invalidate an Act of Parliament on such grounds.

In relation to secondary legislation (statutory instruments) the courts could in theory strike down provisions on the grounds of breach of the rule of law (which might be said to be *ultra vires*, in the absence of very clear or direct authority in the authorising act of parliament) but in practice as far as I know it has never happened.

In other words, the rule of law lacks full justiciability. Perhaps confusingly, or ironically, the Rule of Law is not in the strict sense a rule of law. But however deeply, inchoately, and inconsistently, the rule of law still to some extent affects tax policy and case law outcomes.

### 2.5.4 *Tax: rule of law compliance*

As the rule of law is a set of principles, this issue raises a set of almost impossibly broad questions.

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<sup>87</sup> Speech to OECD International Tax Conference, June 2015, as reported <http://www.bna.com/beps-troublegloves-off-b17179928708/>

In earlier editions<sup>88</sup> of this book, I said:

The UK tax system is largely<sup>89</sup> based on the rule of law rather than informal practice and discretion.

By the 13th edition (2014) I qualified the boast:

However, that is less the case than formerly, due to:

- (1) wide, complex, or vague anti-avoidance provisions mitigated by informal practice, HMRC guidance, HMRC discretion or oversight.
- (2) retrospective legislation.<sup>90</sup>

In 2014 the City of London Law Society said:

2.4 ... tax policymakers are insufficiently conscious of the importance of the rule of law – that is, the constitutional right of a citizen to determine the law applicable to him at any given date. Related to this is a similar problem of lack of respect for legislation as the only proper source of law, and over-reliance on guidance.<sup>91</sup>

In 2015 the Law Society makes the same point:

... in recent years, there has been a tendency on the part of government to allow the rule of law in taxation to risk being eroded in the interests of making the executive more effective, in particular in seeking to combat avoidance...

The following examples draw on the lists of these bodies supplemented by my own:

- (1) The absence of a right to appeal so obligations are determined by HMRC discretion:
  - (a) The Banking Code of Practice on Taxation; there is no right of appeal against HMRC determination of a breach of the code.
  - (b) Follower notices: there is no right of appeal against the issue of such a notice on a number of important grounds.

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88 See Kessler, *Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 2004).

89 For one exception, see 11.23 (Forward tax agreements).

90 Kessler, *Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries* (13th Edn., 2014) Vol 1 para 2.4 (The rule of law).

91 Response to OTS competitiveness review (May 2014)

<http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/attachments/article/105/20140605%20Response%20to%20Office%20of%20Tax%20Simplification%E2%80%99s%20Competitiveness%20review%20-%20initial%20thoughts%20and%20call%20for%20evidence'.pdf>

- (2) Retrospective taxation.
- (3) Uncertainty in tax law. Sometimes this may be deliberate. For instance, Jim Harra, Director General, Business Tax at HMRC applauds the uncertainty of the proposed GAAR:

It will also create an additional level of uncertainty for the promoters and users of schemes. I believe that that will be a deterrent.<sup>92</sup>

- (4) Anti-avoidance legislation drafted widely and then cut down by HMRC concession mislabeled as guidance. Examples include:
  - (a) s.30 FA 2014 (avoidance by transfer of corporate profits)
  - (b) The capital-loss TAAR.<sup>93</sup>

## 2.6 TAARs

TAAR stands for “targeted anti-avoidance rule”. It is used to describe unallowable purpose tests in specific UK tax codes (as opposed to the GAAR, which applies throughout taxation).

This term was coined by HMRC and first used in a press release of 5 December 2005. Before then the term used was motive (or purpose) test. In the older TAARs, such as the ToA and TiS motive defences, those remain the standard terms.

The number of TAARs is very large.<sup>94</sup>

I would distinguish three types of TAAR, depending on the nature of the unallowable purpose test. I coin the following terminology to describe them:

<b>Style of TAAR</b>	<b>Unallowable purpose expressed as</b>
Avoidance-purpose TAAR	Tax avoidance (in its strict sense)
Tax-advantage TAAR	Obtaining a tax advantage (not requiring avoidance in strict sense)
Application (or effect) TAAR	Avoiding the application (or effect) of specified provisions

A tax-advantage style TAAR is very wide, if one understands “tax

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92 Hansard, Public Accounts - Minutes of Evidence (6 December 2012)

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpublicacc/788/121206.htm>

93 See 63.19 (Capital loss TAAR).

94 Unallowable Purpose Tests Draft Guidance p.7 gave the number as “over 200” but countless more have been added since 2009. For that guidance, see 38.1 (Motive defence: Introduction).



advantage” to include cases where there is no element of tax avoidance.

An application/effect style TAAR may be wider still. In the view of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, this wording is too wide and vague.<sup>95</sup> But HMRC do not take any notice of that. It continues to be a common form (perhaps the most common form) for new TAARs.

Although there is a variation of wording, TAARs share a common framework, or there are at least 3 common sets of frameworks, and cases on one TAAR may shed light on others. The most litigated is the TiS purpose test, though in recent years there have been many cases on the loan relationships TAAR.

## 2.7 “Tax advantage”

The expression “tax advantage” is used in (what I call) tax-advantage style TAARs. It is defined on each occasion. There is no single standard definition, but the definitions generally adopt common form wording, with minor variations, so it is helpful to consider the definitions together as a single topic.

In this definition the word “tax” is generally restricted to specified taxes, but that is not addressed here.

### 2.7.1 *Standard IT/CGT definition of “tax advantage”*

The expression was first used in the TiS purpose test in 1960, and that definition survives in the current CT version of the rules. Section 732(1) CTA 2010 provides:

In this Part “corporation tax advantage” means—

- (a) a relief from corporation tax or increased relief from corporation tax,
- (b) a repayment of corporation tax or increased repayment of corporation tax,
- (c) the avoidance or reduction of a charge to corporation tax or an assessment to corporation tax, or
- (d) the avoidance of a possible assessment to corporation tax.

I refer to this as “**the standard IT/CGT definition**” of tax advantage.

### 2.7.2 *GAAR definition of “tax advantage”*

Section 208 FA 2013 provides:

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<sup>95</sup> See 2.5.2 (Rule of law v. other values).

A “tax advantage” includes—

- (a) relief or increased relief from tax,
- (b) repayment or increased repayment of tax,
- (c) avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax,
- (d) avoidance of a possible assessment to tax,
- (e) deferral of a payment of tax or advancement of a repayment of tax, and
- (f) avoidance of an obligation to deduct or account for tax.

I refer to this as **“the GAAR definition”** of tax advantage.

The GAAR definition is wider than the TiS definition in three respects:

- (1) It has become an inclusive definition. But since it is so widely defined, it is not easy to think of anything which is a tax advantage which does not fall within paras (a) to (f).
- (2) Paras (e) and (f) are added.
- (3) The word “tax” is widely defined. Section 206(3) FA 2013 provides:
  - (3) The general anti-abuse rule applies to the following taxes—
    - (a) income tax,
    - (b) corporation tax, including any amount chargeable as if it were corporation tax or treated as if it were corporation tax,
    - (c) capital gains tax,
    - (d) petroleum revenue tax,
    - (da) diverted profits tax,
    - (e) inheritance tax,
    - (f) stamp duty land tax, and
    - (g) annual tax on enveloped dwellings.

Post-2013 anti-avoidance provisions often adopt the GAAR definition by reference (though generally with a narrower definition of “tax”).

### 2.7.3 *IHT definition of “tax advantage”*

Section 162A(8) IHTA defines tax advantage:

In this section ...

“tax advantage” means—

- (a) the avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax, or
- (b) the avoidance of a possible determination in respect of tax.

I refer to this as **“the standard IHT definition”**.

This based on the standard TiS definition of tax advantage adapted as appropriate for IHT.

## 2.8 Retrospective tax legislation

This topic deserves a section to itself.

### 2.8.1 *Retrospective legislation: Extent*

Examples include:

(1) Retrospective reversal of avoidance schemes; for examples see:

- (a) 47.22 (DT relief for partnership)
- (b) s.23 FA 2012 (loan relationships)

It is perhaps only a slight exaggeration to say that retrospective tax legislation has become a matter of routine, having been applied to a somewhat arbitrary selection of tax avoidance schemes.

(2) Legislation not retrospective in its wording, but retrospective in effect in that it is designed to affect arrangements carried out under old law, or (deliberately or otherwise) lacks fair and appropriate transitional provisions. Examples include:

- (a) Pre-owned assets (2004)<sup>96</sup>
- (b) IHT treatment of former Accumulation & Maintenance trusts (2006)
- (c) Aspects of the ITA remittance rules (2008)<sup>97</sup>

(3) It has also become common as second thoughts to (what the need for retrospective legislation shows to be) ill thought out legislation; but insofar as retrospective legislation favours the taxpayer, perhaps it is less objectionable on rule of law grounds.

### 2.8.2 *Retrospective legislation: Protocol*

In Budget 2011, the coalition Government published a statement (grandly labelled a “protocol”) on retrospective legislation. The most important part provides:

The Government has made clear its aim to strike the right balance between

- [1] restoring the UK tax system’s reputation for predictability, stability and simplicity (!) and
- [2] preserving its ability to protect the Exchequer by making changes where necessary.

In particular, changes to tax legislation where the change takes effect

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96 See 88.39.2 (Retrospectivity).

97 See 1.8.3 (Fairness of 2008 reforms).

from a date earlier than the date of announcement will be wholly exceptional.<sup>98</sup>

The attempt to formulate the principles behind a decision to enact retrospective legislation is to be applauded. But the sanction (if any) for ignoring the protocol is political only. It is not enforceable in the courts. That is self-evident, but if authority is needed:

The Protocol was an extra-statutory announcement or promise made by the government. As such, it operated: in the realm of politics, not of the courts, and the question whether the government should be held to such a promise is a political rather than a legal matter... The sovereignty of Parliament cannot be confined by extra-statutory promises like the Protocol.<sup>99</sup>

I think it as it should be: this is a matter for parliament and not for the courts.

The 2011 statement does not purport to bind future governments. The Cameron administration (May 2015 - July 2016) did not resile from it, but whether the current or subsequent administrations will follow it remains to be seen.

### 2.8.3 *Retrospective legislation: Validity*

All authorities discussing the rule of law agree that it includes a prohibition of retrospective legislation, so there is no doubt that such legislation breaches the rule of law. As noted above, it is not for that reason rendered invalid as the rule of law is not justiciable as such. Human Rights challenges have not been successful.<sup>100</sup>

### 2.8.4 *Retrospective legislation: Politics*

Various reasons have been given to justify retrospective legislation.<sup>101</sup>

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98 [http://webarhive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget\\_taxavoidance.pdf](http://webarhive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_taxavoidance.pdf)

99 *R oao APVCO 19 Ltd v HM Treasury* [2015] EWCA Civ 648 at [58].

100 See *R oao Huitson v HMRC* [2011] STC 1860; *R oao APVCO 19 Ltd v HM Treasury* [2015] EWCA Civ 648.

101 For an illuminating discussion of the policy issues in a US context, see Shaviro, *When Rules Change* (1<sup>st</sup> ed, 2000). UK taxpayers may on this point look with envy to the USA, where a norm opposing retrospective legislation is “strongly rooted in popular sentiment, legislative practice, and perhaps even the Constitution as the courts are likely to interpret it” (p.104).

One is that the scheme will fail (or so the Government believe). If that is true, the change is unnecessary; if not (and it is generally debatable) it is not a good reason.

Another is that the scheme is abusive (however that flexible term may be understood). Whether that justifies retrospective legislation is ultimately a political question on which views differ depending on how much one values the rule of law. It is arbitrary and unfair in that a few particular schemes are retrospectively stopped and others – no less elaborate, artificial and abusive – are not. Pragmatists (to whom the rule of law is of little interest) should bear in mind that retrospective legislation increases the “legal risk”, a measure under which the UK falls low on international surveys, and the lowering of the UK’s reputation in that regard has a significant albeit intangible cost. I suspect a major factor in picking on some arrangements may be the amount of money involved.

### *2.8.5 Retrospective legislation: Future*

How often will retrospective legislation be used in the future? What advice can anyone give to taxpayers seeking to know their position? Prior to the enactment of the GAAR, I said:

Much depends on the politics of the day, but I guess that retrospective legislation will continue to be a rare response; a popular scheme carried out by many taxpayers and involving larger sums is certainly more at risk than others.<sup>102</sup>

The compatibility of the GAAR with the rule of law is open to debate, on the grounds of vagueness in particular. But one positive consequence may be (and should be) to end the practice of retrospective anti-avoidance legislation altogether; wholly retrospective legislation should no longer be necessary. But partially retrospective legislation, in the form of unfair commencement rules, will no doubt continue.

## **2.9 Naming and shaming**

“Naming and shaming” covers a variety of arrangements. The FA 2014 provisions to name and shame the promoters of tax avoidance schemes and the Code of Practice on Taxation of Banks raise concerns, but the greatest concern is the practice in the media.

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102 Kessler, *Taxation of Non-Residents and Foreign Domiciliaries* (7<sup>th</sup> ed., 2008), Vol.1

The OUCBT paper provides:

... searching for individual or corporate villains will not assist in remedying the underlying problems...

Even if public naming and shaming influences a few taxpayers in the public eye to impose their own voluntary constraints, it will not necessarily affect the worst avoiders, and may even encourage some non-compliance from those who feel that “everyone is at it”. Only understanding the flaws in the tax system and working on serious changes can give long-term results....

Even if that were to have an effect on one taxpayer it would not tackle the underlying issues.

No-one has taken any notice of that! Naming and shaming is at present common for various purposes (more than one may be present at the same time):

- (1) In marketing: To sell newspapers with exposures of celebrities who have been involved in tax avoidance schemes.<sup>103</sup>
- (2) In politics, to knock the opposition by alleging that politicians, or other party supporters, are guilty of tax avoidance. In this respect, anything goes and some stories have been farcical. Thus in 2015 Mandelson was berated for taking a loan from a UK company.<sup>104</sup> Ed Miliband was accused of avoiding tax by means of a deed of variation.<sup>105</sup> The allegations are so off-target as to cast doubt the good faith of those who make them and newspapers which uncritically promote them.
- (3) As a scandalisation technique, to promote the view that avoidance is immoral; often combined with juxtaposition of avoidance and evasion and the suggestion that there is little or no difference.

When these allegations are made it is impossible to defend oneself.

So public debate is not uninformed but misinformed. It is a yeasty mingling of dimly understood facts with vague but deep impressions, and

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103 Typically film schemes, as the names of members of the LLPs concerned are in the public domain.

104 <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/27/peter-mandelson-400000-pound-tax-free-loan> The Guardian later amended its website to concede that the loan had been wrongly described as tax-free.

105 Leading to a gibe in the Spring 2015 budget announcing a policy review deeds of variation. The Guardian rightly asked: what came first – the policy or the joke?

images, half real, half fantastic. It has more than its fair share of misunderstanding and jejune polemics.

In these circumstances, public naming and shaming may quickly lead away from the rule of law. Starbucks paid £20m following a threat to occupy its cafes.<sup>106</sup> If one calls that payment “taxation” at all, it was certainly not taxation imposed by law. A hostile commentator would call this taxation by mob rule. Google and Amazon, who do not have public premises vulnerable to the same threat, have not had to pay similar sums.

## **2.10 Avoidance by multinational companies**

Much attention has been given to multinational companies. The Public Accounts Committee looked at Starbucks, Amazon and Google. The verdict was guilty.<sup>107</sup>

It is not possible to comment sensibly on the taxation of any multinational group without knowing the relevant facts, which are not usually in the public domain. The claim that these companies have avoided UK corporation tax is often based on the size of their UK sales or UK staff, set against the corporation tax actually paid. But all well-informed commentators know that corporation tax is not a tax on sales, or the size of an establishment, and large sales/staff does not mean large profits. The OUCBT paper provides:

Starbucks and Facebook ... have been criticized for not paying tax where they are making sales, but sales are not the basis for the corporation tax, so this alone is no cause for criticism of the companies concerned. We could argue that the tax base should change, but unless and until that occurs, the fact that there is a high turnover but no taxable profit is not in itself an indicator that the taxpayer is behaving in an unreasonable way.

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106 Ironically, the post-tax cost of the payment would have been diminished as it should in principle be deductible in computing taxable profits.

107 Or was it? “We were not convinced that their actions, in using the letter of tax laws both nationally and internationally to immorally minimise their tax obligations, are defensible.” Public Accounts Committee 19<sup>th</sup> report 2012, para 12. If the convoluted wording was intended to reflect a note of caution, it was lost in the public debate. But I think the obfuscation is just the dialect of politics. The PAC returned to this theme in Ninth Report of Session 2013–14 “Tax Avoidance—Google”. A PAC hearing is not, perhaps, well suited to ascertaining the facts; it is not possible to ascertain from this whether the complaint of the PAC is that Google have been conducting successful or unsuccessful tax avoidance.

Likewise the fact that relatively little CT is paid proves nothing. The OUCBT paper provides:

The fact that there is little or no tax payable is not, however, conclusive evidence that there is effective or ineffective avoidance. In some of these cases, these companies are simply operating in accordance with incentives created by the international tax system and by domestic governments trying to attract economic activity into their jurisdictions. This the governments may do for non-tax reasons, or because this activity gives rise to forms of taxes other than those which are not being collected. ...

The IFS say:

A low corporate tax bill is not in itself therefore evidence of tax avoidance. Even if income appears high, there may be genuinely low UK taxable profits if a firm has relatively high current expenditures or can offset the effects of large investment expenditures or losses. The UK tax bill can also be appropriately relatively low compared with declared income if that income is the result of genuinely non-UK activities.

HMRC make the same point:

Globalisation means that multinationals have the opportunity to structure their business to take advantage of beneficial tax rules in different countries. Provided that this results in profits being taxed in line with where genuine economic activity is carried on, this does not amount to tax avoidance. ... In broad terms, companies are required to pay corporation tax in the country where they carry on the economic activity that generates their profits, not where their customers are located.<sup>108</sup>

Unusually, the facts are known in relation to Apple as a result of US congressional hearings (I suspect, better conducted than the UK equivalent). These have been well analysed by Antony Ting.<sup>109</sup> In short, there is no reason to think that Apple have avoided UK tax. The group has avoided Irish/US tax by Irish/US hybrid companies; and, perhaps, it has reduced Irish tax by informal transfer pricing agreements with the Irish Revenue.

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108 HMRC, "Taxing the profits of multinational businesses" Issue Briefing (2012) [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/89030/profits-multinationals.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89030/profits-multinationals.pdf)

109 Ting, "iTax—Apple's International Tax Structure and the Double Non-Taxation Issue" [2014] BTR 40. See 97.1 (Hybrid entities).



### 2.10.1 *Transfer pricing*

It is often said that multinationals engage in avoidance through transfer pricing. For instance, Christian Aid say:

There is debate about the extent to which companies engage in trade mispricing (artificially suppressing the income they earn from activities such as resource extraction, to reduce payments to government), but few would doubt that it has a significant impact on the incomes of governments in the global South.<sup>110</sup>

Transfer pricing is not strictly avoidance. It is in principle in the category of ineffective avoidance:

We may well question whether the transfer pricing rules are adequate, ... but these are considerations relating to tax policy reform and not to tax avoidance.

The fundamental problem is not terminology, but that the facts needed to assess these claims are not in the public domain. Robert Maas says:

The Public Accounts Committee believes that Starbucks overpays for its coffee. I am not an expert on the economics of coffee, but I am a bit puzzled that the PAC members consider themselves sufficiently knowledgeable in this area to be able to pass judgment (sorry, to express scepticism).

The committee thinks that a 16.67% margin to a company that sources and buys coffee throughout the world, exercises quality control and works with local farmers, is excessive. Personally, I do not but then I don't have any expertise in coffee.

The PAC also believes that the rate of interest on the inter-company loan from the US company (4.9%) is excessive, "at a higher rate than any similar loan we have seen". I do not know what similar loans the committee has seen, ie a loan to a loss-making business with little asset backing. I must say it looks modest to me...<sup>111</sup>

If transfer pricing is conducted with the consent of the tax authority concerned, it is not avoidance, though it may be unfair tax competition. The EC are currently pursuing state aid rules;<sup>112</sup> it will be interesting to see

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110 Christian Aid, "Tax for the common good (2014)

<http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/Tax-Morality-Report-J2951.pdf>

111 Maas, *Taxation Magazine*, 27 February 2013.

112 See 69.19 (State Aid).

what results.

### 2.10.2 GAAR

The GAAR guidance provides:

Many of the established rules of international taxation are set out in double taxation treaties. These cover, for example,

- [1] the attribution of profits to branches or between group companies of multi-national enterprises, and
- [2] the allocation of taxing rights to the different states where such enterprises operate.

The fact that arrangements benefit from these rules does not mean that the arrangements amount to abuse, and so the GAAR cannot be applied to them. Accordingly, many cases of the sort which generated a great deal of media and parliamentary debate in the months leading up to the enactment of the GAAR cannot be dealt with by the GAAR.<sup>113</sup>

In my terminology, these issues are non-avoidance, and in some cases, tax avoidance, but not tax abuse.

But where there is abuse, one country's domestic GAAR cannot resolve the issue. Apple's planning, for instance, turned on a hybrid entity:

- (1) transparent under Irish tax law, and so not paying tax on its profits in Ireland;
- (2) opaque in US tax law, and so not paying tax on its profits in the US.

CIOT say:

As in much of the BEPS project, this is not a case of tax avoidance as previously understood; there can be no avoidance where there is no intent to tax in the first place.<sup>114</sup>

It seems to me that planning with a hybrid entity may properly be described as tax avoidance if it is the case that:

- (1) The intention of Oireachtas is that the entity's income should be taxed

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113 HMRC, "GAAR Guidance" (2017) para B5.2

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-avoidance-general-anti-abuse-rules>.

The House of Lords Select Committee made the same point

114 CIOT, "BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements (Recommendations for domestic laws) Response by CIOT (May 2014)

<https://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/comments-action-2-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements.pdf>

in the US, and

- (2) The intention of US Congress is that the entity's income should be taxed in Ireland.

One might refer to it as international tax avoidance (though there is of course no such tax as “international tax”). The tax advantage is not contrary to the tax policy of either country in isolation; it is the result of a gap between the two.<sup>115</sup> However the gap may in fact be intentional, in that both Ireland and the US deliberately chose to facilitate the planning;<sup>116</sup> in which case the planning should not be called avoidance at all.

### 2.10.3 BEPS

Whatever the terminology, CIOT are right to say that the tools to deal with multinational planning/avoidance will not be the same as those used for domestic tax avoidance. It is an international problem which only international consensus can resolve.

OECD has been tasked with doing something on the taxation of multinational companies, and has produced an “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” and a raft of reports and proposals.<sup>117</sup> It will be interesting to see what emerges. The difficulty of achieving international consensus is considerable:

the OECD had a mandate from G-20, whose members include the BRICS countries, which often disagree with OECD tax policies; the United States, which often goes its own way; and from European finance ministers ... who generally don't agree on anything but agree on the need for change ...<sup>118</sup>

We should never lose sight of the fact that public debates about tax avoidance are simultaneously fiscal, moral and political debates, raising issues of equality, redistribution, class, and tax competition; and sensitive ears may also detect elements of xenophobia.

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115 See de Boer & Nouwen (eds) *The EU's struggle with Mismatches and Aggressive Tax Planning* (2013), para 3.5.2 (General anti-abuse rule).

116 Ting, “Old wine in a new bottle: Ireland's revised definition of corporate residence and the war on BEPS” [2014] BTR 237.

117 <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf>

118 Ault, “Some Reflections on the OECD and the Sources of International Tax Principles” (2013) 70(12) Tax Notes International 1195.

